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When I attended the first lesson of an optional subject Introduction to US law, 
which is taught at our faculty by hosting foreign professors, I had very little knowledge 
of issues concerning trademarks in the Internet context. However, Prof. James Levy 
from the Shepard Broad College of Law, Nova Southeastern University, enthusiastically 
introduced us to this topic, which has been widely discussed by legal experts in the US 
and also in Western Europe and yet it was a relatively unfamiliar topic to me and my 
classmates. 
Even though trademarks are a part of intellectual property rights, they do not 
protect results of creative or research activities. The primary purpose of a trademark is 
communication of information between a manufacturer or service provider and an end-
user. Thanks to trademarks, consumers are able to immediately distinguish products of 
one undertaking from another. This allows consumers to repeatedly purchase products 
they have been previously satisfied with, saves their time and guarantees an expected 
level of product´s quality. At the same time, manufacturers are able to communicate 
with customers and enjoy protection against competitors of investments made into 
brand marketing and improvement of quality.  
The Internet has become one of the most important communication channels. 
Manufacturers, distributors, sellers and service providers offer their goods and services 
online, which not only reduces their operating costs but also enables them to reach 
customers remotely. Obviously, it has brought new challenges to intellectual property 
law, including trademark law. Trademarks have been traditionally understood as marks 
that were physically placed on products in order to pass them off to customers. 
However, the Internet created an environment for new forms of utilization of 
trademarks, which were not anticipated by existing legal regulation. Online keyword 
advertising is one of them.  
The main reason why I chose this topic is because it interconnects the “old and 
new.” Trademarks are a very traditional element of law, with history reaching back to 
ancient civilizations. Even though new forms of trademarks, such as sound marks, have 
been introduced to some laws recently, their historical development has been rather 
conservative. The Internet, on the other hand, as a global system of computer networks, 
is a landmark invention of the 20th century. Except for being a general tool for searching 
and sharing information, it has also become a major source of revenue.  
1 
 
The sources for the theoretical part are mostly foreign cases and expert articles. 
There are not many books concerning keyword advertising. Books and commentaries I 
used are more concerned with the general nature of intellectual property law or 
trademarks specifically. Quite frequently, I also referred to online blogs that are written 
by some leading experts in the field, such as Eric Goldman.   
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter is devoted to a general 
introduction to trademarks. This part describes briefly the history of trademarks, current 
legal definitions of trademarks, as well as the legal frameworks of trademarks law. It 
focuses on an elements of trademark distinctiveness and analyses functions of 
trademarks. Last but not least, it also describes basic classifications of trademarks and 
provides their examples. 
The second chapter introduces the issue of keyword advertising. It focuses on a 
description of the operation of Internet search engines, keyword advertising programs 
and Google´s current policy. Finally, it also provides an illustrative example of keyword 
advertising that affects trademark law.  
The third chapter concentrates on the development of case law concerning 
keyword advertising in the US. The development is described in two key elements of 
trademark infringement in the US, i.e. “use of a trademark in commerce” in a way that 
is “likely to cause consumer confusion.”   
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the development of case law concerning 
keyword advertising in the EU. The analysis is primarily focused on preliminary rulings 
of the ECJ and subsequent rulings of national courts in the member states. 
The fifth chapter provides a brief comparison of both transatlantic approaches 
and conclusions reached by respective courts. 
The sixth and last chapter concentrates on the recent pilot ruling regarding 
keyword advertising in the Czech Republic and briefly introduces protection of 
trademark rights provided by law against unfair competition. Though it could be 
included in the fourth chapter, I decided to devote a separate chapter thereto in order to 
highlight the significance thereof. Please note that except for a brief media coverage I 




1.1.   Introduction to Trademarks 
Trademark is a form of intellectual property that was developed long time before 
their legal protection was established. Even though it is not possible to determine 
accurately when a mankind first started to use symbols or signs to mark either 
ownership or commercial origin, it is assumed that it happened contemporaneously with 
the evolution of trade and ownership. In ancient China, for instance, marks were placed 
on pottery as long ago as 3000 BC.1  
Even though trading conditions nowadays are far more developed and despite 
the long history of trademarks, their use has not changed significantly. The primary 
purpose of use of trademarks is to provide information. Originally, trademarks were 
placed on products to communicate to consumers a guarantee of quality. Later, 
trademarks have also been used to inform consumers of the origin of the goods.2 
Trademarks serve to protect both sides of a trade, manufacturers and customers. 
Customers may be confident that a product, which bears a particular trademark, is a 
product that they look for. Owners of trademarks are given protection to their 
investment of time and money to development from misappropriation by third parties.3 
Unlike patents or copyrights, trademarks are not exclusive nor monopolistic 
rights in a way that they “do not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or words 
(…). A trademark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the 
owner´s good will against the sale of another´s product as his.”4 
 
1.2.   Legal Definition of Trademark 
Trademarks are subject to national, European as well as international legal 
regulation. The term “trademark” (in Czech “ochranná známka”) is not unified 
throughout different legal systems. In the US for instance, the Lanham Act distinguishes 
trademarks (also unregistered or common law trademarks) indicated as “TM” and 
registered trademarks indicated as “®.” European law provides for the protection of the 
“EU trade mark.” While some laws, such as the Paris Convention for Protection of 
                                                            
1 NORMAN, Helen. Intellectual Property Law. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press. 2014. p. 328. 
2 Ibid., p. 333 
3 BARRETH, Margreth. Intellectual Property – Cases and Materials. American Casebook Series. 2nd 
Edition. West Group. 2001. p.674  
4 Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
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Industrial Property or the Lanham Act, distinguish “trademarks” and “servicemarks” (or 
“service marks”), which are trademarks designated to identify a service, other laws, 
such as Regulation or Act on Trademarks make no difference thereto.5     
The most important international conventions are the Convention Establishing 
the World Intellectual Property Organization6, the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks7 and its Protocol8 and the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property9. European law concerning trademarks is particularly 
represented by the Directive and the Regulation10. Due to the Directive, substantive 
trademark laws of the EU member states have reached high level of harmonization11. 
Also, differences between national trademarks and the EU trade mark are rather 
marginal12. The principal piece of legislation concerning trademarks in the Czech 
Republic is the Act on Trademarks13. In the US, federal trademark law is stipulated by 
the Lanham Act14. Last but not least, the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions 
on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the 
Internet (hereinafter as the “Joint Recommendation”)15 plays an important unifying part 
in laws governing the use of trademarks on the Internet, even though it is not binding16. 
In the official explanatory note to the Art. 6 of the Joint Recommendation, it also 
explicitly requires the participating states to protect rights in trademarks in use of 
                                                            
5 HORÁČEK, Roman a kol. Zákon o ochranných známkách. Zákon o ochraně označení původu a 
zeměpisných označení. Zákon o vymáhání práv z průmyslového vlastnictví. Komentář. 2. vydání. Praha : 
C.H.Beck. 2008. p. 56. 
6 The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed in Stockholm on 14 
July, 1967. 
7 The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, signed in Madrid in 1891. 
8 The Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, 
signed in Madrid in 1989. 
9 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in Paris on 20 March, 1883. 
10 Author´s Note: The Regulation was recently amended by Regulation 2015/2424, which came into force 
on 23 March, 2016, and replaced the Community trade mark with European Union trade mark. 
11 COOK, Trevor. EU Intellectual Property Law. Oxford University Press. 2010. p. 227-228. 
12 HÁK, Jan. Známkové právo v mezinárodních souvislostech. Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk. 
2012, p. 74-77.  
13 Act No. 441/2003 Coll., on Trademarks. 
14 Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.  
15 The Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial 
Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, adopted by WIPO and the Assembly of the Paris Union for the 
Protection of Industrial Property in September 2001.  
16 The Joint Recommendation among others sets forth rules for determination whether the trademark has 
been “used” in a particular state, meaning that the “use” has taken place in that state. It applies the aspect 
of a commercial effect. It provides demonstrative list of factors which the authorities shall take into 
account in determining whether use of a sign on the Internet has a commercial effect in a state (such as 
the scope of services that a user of a sign renders in a state, language of that services etc.).   
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trademarks in banner advertisements or sale or purchase as keywords for Internet search 
engines17.  
According to Art. 1 of the Act on Trademarks, trademark “may consist of any 
sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, colours, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or their packaging, 
provided that such sign is capable of distinguishing goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of another undertaking.”18   
 
1.3.   Distinctiveness of Trademarks 
Substantive requirements of trademarks fall into two categories. First, 
trademarks must be distinctive in order to be able to distinguish the relevant goods and 
services. A mark can either acquire distinctiveness or it may be inherently distinctive. 
Second, it must not fall into any of the categorical statutory exclusions19.  
There are three categories of distinctiveness. Marks may be either inherently 
distinctive, or may be capable of acquiring distinctiveness (descriptive marks) or may 
be generic terms.20  
Inherently distinctive marks are either arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive. A mark 
is inherently distinctive if “its intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.”21 
It qualifies for protection regardless of proving acquired distinctiveness among 
consumers. Both arbitrary and descriptive marks do not imply nor describe any 
characteristics of the goods or services. Arbitrary mark is an existing symbol that has 
been chosen as a mark and has no logical relation to the goods or services. Examples of 
arbitrary marks are “APPLE” for electronics or “CAMEL” for cigarettes. Unlike 
arbitrary marks, fanciful marks are devised, invented for the only purpose of serving as 
trademarks. Examples of fanciful marks are “KODAK” or “Exxon”. Suggestive marks 
suggest the characteristics or quality of the goods and services, but do not describe it. 
                                                            
17 Explanatory note No. 6.03 of the Joint Recommendation.  
18 Author´s Note: Definition of the EU trade mark provided for by the Regulation is identical, except for 
explicit mention of “colour.” For the definition of a trademark under the Lanham Act, see Sec. 1127 of 
the Lanham Act.  
19 Author´s Note: Statutory categorical exclusions include inter alia immoral marks or government 
symbols. Exclusions are listed in Art. 4 of the Act on Trademarks; Art. 3 and 4 of the Directive; Art. 7 of 
the Regulation and Sec. 1052 of the Lanham Act.  
20 MCJOHN, Spethen M. Intellectual Property. Examples & Explanations. Fifth Edition. Wolters Kluwer. 
2015. p. 262. 
21 Two Peson v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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Category of suggestive marks falls between arbitrary/fanciful marks and descriptive 
marks. Examples of suggestive marks are “Playboy”, “Citibank” or “Jaguar”.22  
Marks that are descriptive qualify for a trademark protection only if they acquire 
secondary meaning. Thus a primary meaning of a mark would be to identify a particular 
source and the descriptive sense would be secondary. A mark acquires secondary 
meaning if “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of the mark is to 
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.”23 Examples of 
descriptive marks are “Holiday Inn”, “Best Buy”, “Coca Cola” or surnames, such as 
“McDonalds”.24 
Generic terms do not distinguish one seller from another and do not qualify for a 
trademark protection. Examples of generic terms are “restaurant”, “candy” or “soda”.25 
 
1.4.   Functions of Trademarks 
Trademarks serve several functions to both, trademark owners and customers. 
Some functions have been traditionally attached to trademarks as their fundamental 
attributes – for instance origin function. However, some functions were also established 
by case law and jurisprudence, such as the investment function.  
In Europe the ECJ interpreted, that among others, adverse effect on the functions 
of a trademark is one of the requirements for trademark infringement26. Use of the 
trademark by a third party must affect or be liable to affect the functions of the 
trademark27. Thus courts in the EU need to analyze in each particular case whether the 
adverse effect has occurred.  
1.4.1. Origin Function 
Origin function is the primary function of trademarks. Through the origin 
function, trademarks indicate to customers the commercial origin of the goods or 
services. It informs customers of the identity of the undertaking which created the 
product in the first place and which is responsible for its quality.28  
                                                            
22 MCJOHN, S. M., op. cit., p. 263-264. 
23 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
24 MCJOHN, S. M., op. cit., p. 264-265. 
25 Ibid., p. 269. 
26 Google France, para. 49. 
27 Ibid., para. 75.  
28 NORMAN, H., op. cit., p. 337-338. 
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The major importance of the function of origin was also acknowledged by the 
ECJ. The ECJ ruled that “the essential function of a trademark was to guarantee the 
identity or origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user.”29 The 
ECJ approached trademark infringement from the trademark owner´s perspective. 
Origin function protects trademark owners against third parties that would wish to take 
unfair advantage of the trademark. In Europe, adverse effect on the origin function was 
closely associated with the confusion that the use of a trademark by a third party is 
likely to cause. 
1.4.2. Product Differentiation Function 
Trademarks distinguish goods and services of one undertaking from those of 
others. Product differentiation function is closely related to the function of origin as it 
may be considered as a specific part thereof. However, the ECJ has concluded 
otherwise. According to the ECJ, this function specifically enables customers to choose 
one product from another knowing that the products originate from a particular 
undertaking, which is responsible for its quality30.    
1.4.3. Guarantee Function 
As explained in the introduction to trademarks, the guarantee function is the 
original function of trademarks. It provides degree of certainty that the goods or services 
have the same quality as those purchased before. The main purpose is to guarantee the 
consistency and safety of a product as well as certain level of standard. This function of 
trademarks involves strong aspect of a consumer protection.31 
1.4.4. Advertising Function 
Advertising function primarily protects an owner of a trademark from free-riding 
on the trademark´s selling power based on its reputation. This function is more 
emphasized with regards to famous and successful brands. For instance, a competitor 
may take unfair advantage of the trademark to gain a quick access to the market.  
1.4.5. Investment Function 
Investment function of trademarks was firstly introduced by the ECJ. Its purpose 
is to gain and preserve good reputation that is capable of attracting consumers and 
                                                            
29 Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed, C-206/01 (2002), para. 48. 
30 Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products, C-299/99 (2002), para. 47-50. 
31 NORMAN, H., op. cit.,p. 339-340. 
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maintaining their loyalty. The investment function may not be utilized only through 
advertising, but also through other marketing channels.32 
As explained in the following chapters, in cases concerning keyword 
advertising, an adverse effect on the advertising and investment function of trademarks 
has been obviously widely discussed.33 
 
1.5.   Classification of Trademarks 
Trademarks may be classified based on several criteria34. The most common 
classification of trademarks in legal theory is based on a form of trademarks. With this 
regard, we distinguish word marks, figurative marks, combined marks and three-
dimensional marks35. Broader classification also include color per se mark, sound mark 
or olfactory mark36. 
Word mark is a mark that is formed of a word, name, combination of letters, 
words, numbers or any other symbols that can be typed37. The selected mark should be 
regardless of its design distinctive and should not have descriptive character in relation 
to protected goods or services38. An example of the word mark is the EU trademark 
“MARLBORO”, trademark No. 00007686939. 
Figuratie marks are formed of graphics, images or pictures40. An example of the 
figurative mark is the EU trademark registered by Reebok “ ”, 
trademark No. 00000045641. 
                                                            
32 L´Oréal v. Bellure, para 58; Interflora, para. 60. 
33 Google France, para 91 et seq.; Interflora, para. 54 et seq.  
34 Author´s Note: Other classification may be based on a trademark holder (individual x collective), 
registration in a trademark register (registered trademark x common trademark), territorial applicability 
(national x international x EU trade mark) etc.  
35 LAZÍKOVÁ, Jarmila. Základy práva duševného vlastníctva. Iura Edition. 2012. p. 133-134.  
36 EUIPO. Available at: https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/trade-mark-definition. 
37 HORÁČEK, Roman, BISKUPOVÁ, Eva, DE KORVER, Zuzana. Práva na označení a jejich vymáhání 
(Zákon o ochranných známkách, Zákon o ochraně označení původu a zeměpisných označení, Zákon 
o vymáhání práv z průmyslového vlastnictví). Komentář. 3. doplněné vydání. Praha: C. H. Beck. 2015. p. 
4. 
38 HORÁČEK, R. a kol., op. cit., p. 59. 
39 Author´s Note: Registered by Philip Morris Global Brands Inc. 
40 HORÁČEK, Roman, ČADA, Karel, HAJN, Petr. Práva k průmyslovému vlastnictví. 2. vydání. Praha : 
C.H.Beck. 2011. p. 353. 
41 Author´s Note: Registered by Reebok International Limited.  
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Combined mark (or figurative mark with letters) combines word mark and 
figurative mark. Hence, it is formed of pictures, graphics or images with words, letters, 
numbers or any other typed symbols. It may also be a specific graphic design of words. 
Combined mark may also contain an element incapable of registration as a mark itself, 
i.e. either non-distinctive or descriptive, however in combination with other elements of 
the mark, it may gain required distinctiveness42. An example of the combined mark is 
the EU trademark “ ”, trademark No. 00027788943. 
Three-dimensional mark is a three-dimensional shape, such as packaging (e.g. 
triangular-shape of Toblerone packaging) or the actual product (e.g. Bounty candy 
bar)44. An example of the three-dimensional mark is the EU trademark                             
“ ”, trademark No. 00123173745. 
Colour per se mark is a mark formed of colour that distinguishes goods and 
services of one undertaking from those of others. In an application for registration, the 
colour must be conretized, for instance by providing shade number according to 
standartized color charts46. An example of the colour per se mark is the Czech mark 
registered by O2 Holdings Ltd. “ ”, trademark 
No. 332152.  
                                                            
42 HORÁČEK, Roman, ČADA, K., HAJN, P., op. cit., p. 357.  
43 Author´s Note: Registered by NIKE Innovate C.V. 
44 HORÁČEK, R., BISKUPOVÁ, E., DE KORVER, Z., op. cit., p. 5. 
45 Author´s Note: Registered by NESTLE WATERS.  
46 HORÁČEK, R., BISKUPOVÁ, E., DE KORVER, Z., op. cit., p. 5. 
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Sound mark (e.g. Family Frost ringtone) may not be registered in the Czech 
Republic. However, EUIPO allowes for registration of sound marks. Nevertheless, 
sound marks must be represented graphically, using, for example, musical notation.  
Olfactory marks (such as smell of perfumes) do not qualify for registration 
























2. Keyword Advertising 
2.1.   Introduction to Keyword Advertising 
Internet search engines have become almost indispensable tools for searching for 
products, services, pieces of information or any other particular content on the Internet. 
Very often C-users do not know or have no recollection of a particular website address 
or domain name, where certain products, services or information are located. Search 
engines help them to find it. The largest search engines according to its market share are 
Google (67%), Bing (12%), Yahoo! (9%) or Chinese Baidu (9%)47.  
Based on applied automatic algorithms or formulas, a C-user who enters a term 
or a phrase into a search engine would get a list of search results on a page listing 
hyperlinks to webpages that the search engine identified as the most relevant to the 
search request. These results, also called as “organic results” or “natural results,” are 
sorted by its relevancy based on purely objective criteria, with the most relevant 
appearing on the top of the webpage.48  
Words or phrases that the C-users enter into the search engine are called 
“keywords.” A keyword may be a single word, term or a phrase.49 
When the C-user searches for keywords, the search engine may not only provide 
the C-user with organic results, but also paid advertisements, usually located above, 
below or alongside the organic results. When an online advertising program, which is 
operated by the search engine provider, recognizes that a particular keyword, that has 
been purchased by an advertiser, is searched for, it triggers advertisement. This 
advertisement would appear on the search result page in order to target the C-user. A 
typical advertisement consists of a commercial message and a link to the advertiser´s 
webpage. If the C-user clicks on the advertisement, he is redirected on the advertiser´s 
webpage, where usually relevant goods and services are offered for sale.50  
Since search engines are daily used by billions of people around the world, they 
have realized the potential of delivering online contextual advertising.  Hence, they have 
developed their own advertising programs. The first commercially successful keyword 
                                                            
47 As of September 2015. Available at: https://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-market-
share.aspx?qprid=4&qpcustomd=0. 
48 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro to Google France, para. 2-3, 9; Google France, para. 22. 
49 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro to Google France, para. 9. 
50 Rosetta Stone v. Google Inc. US District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division. 2010. 
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advertising was launched by GoTo.com in 199851. Nowadays, the major advertising 
programs are Google AdWords, Yahoo! Search Marketing, Bing Ads, or Sklik for 
Seznam.cz.   
In detailed explanation below, I will focus on Google AdWords. Most of the 
advertising programs operate on a very similar basis and Google AdWords is by far the 
largest one and most involved in litigations described in the next chapters.   
 
2.2.   Google AdWords 
Google AdWords is an advertising program that triggers advertisements to C-
users who search on any of the Google´s search networks52. Advertisements may be text 
ads, image ads, video ads or rich media ads, which typically include animation.  
On the Czech domain of Google - google.cz, text advertisements appear above, 
below or alongside the organic results. The font size, color and typeface are identical to 
the organic results. Advertisements are labeled as “Ad(s)” (in Czech “Reklama” or 
“Reklamy”).  The way of separating the advertisements from the organic results may, 
however, vary from state to state, for instance using a yellow rectangular background 
instead53.   
As explained above, advertisements on AdWords are based on keywords, which 
are purchased by advertisers pursuant to its relevancy to their goods and services. The 
keywords match the advertisements with terms that C-users search for. In order to have 
the advertisement displayed, the selected keyword must match or be similar to the 
search term.  
Advertisers can either select keywords on their own or use a tool called 
Keyword Planner54, which is designed to inter alia provide the advertisers with a list of 
the most suitable and relevant keywords to their business and help them to efficiently 
promote their goods or services.55   
                                                            
51  JANSEN, Bernard, MULLEN, Tracy. Sponsored search: An overview of the concept, history, and 
technology. International Journal of Electronic Business. 2008. Vol. 6. No. 2. p. 114-131. 
52 Author´s Note: Google´s search networks include Google search engine and other Google´s sites such 
as Maps or Shopping. They include also partners´ networks such as Netscape´s AOL search and display 
networks such as YouTube or Gmail. [AdWords Support. Available at: 
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1752334?ctx=glossary (accessed on 8. June 2016)]. 
53 Rosetta Stone v. Google Inc., US District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division. 2010. 
54 Author´s Note: Keyword Planner substituted Keyword Suggestion Tool, which is mentioned in some of 
the cases analysed in the chapter Case Law in the US.  
55 AdWords Support. Available at: https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2999770. 
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The quality of selected keywords and commercial message56 combined with 
maximum bid price and expected effect of extensions determine the overall position of 
an advertisement, i.e. the location of the advertisement on the search result page or 
whether the advertisement is eligible to show at all. The rank of the advertisement is 
regularly recalculated and thus the advertisement´s position may change each time 
depending on the current competition.57  
The price for an advertisement is usually based on so called maximum cost-per-
click bid58, which represents the maximum price that an advertiser is willing to spend 
for each click on an ad59. However, the actual price is usually less. Every time a C-user 
searches for a keyword, AdWords runs all the corresponding ads through an auction 
which defines which particular ads and on what position will be showed. The final price 
is based on the minimum that is required to hold the ad position. Various quality factors 
are assessed in order to determine the ability of the advertisement to hold its position. 
Generally speaking, the more historical clicks and positive impressions the 
advertisement has, the lower price is charged to have it displayed.60    
2.2.1. AdWords Illustration 
In order to better illustrate how AdWords works in practice and what the impact 
on trademark law might be, I provide the following example.  
Two undertakings, A and B, both create and sell antivirus software. While B is a 
start-up, A is well known in business and its antivirus software, also called A, enjoys 
good reputation among customers. One day, B decides to promote its product on 
Google. For that purpose, it purchases keywords on AdWords so that whenever a C-user 
does a search using such terms, B´s advertisement will appear on the search result page. 
Accordingly, three situations may occur.  
First, B buys the keyword “antivirus software.” Whenever a C-user enters 
“antivirus software” in the search engine, the advertisement of B will be triggered to 
appear above, below or next to the natural results. Since “antivirus software” is a 
                                                            
56 Author´s Note: Quality is based on factors such as expected clickthrough rate, ad relevance and landing 
page experience. 
57 AdWords Support. Available at: https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1752122?ctx=glossary. 
58 Author´s Note: Also called “max. CPC.” 
59 Author´s Note: Another pricing method, which is much less used, is cost-per-thousand impressions 
(also called “CPM”). 




generic term, it is not capable of a trademark protection and no trademark infringement 
may possibly be claimed.  
However, B may also cause its advertisement to appear whenever a C-user 
searches for the term “A,” which is not only a company name, but also name of its 
product and registered trademark of A, a direct competitor of B. As a result, whenever 
the C-user types in “A,” wishing to search for its products, a sponsored link would be 
displayed on the search result page, promoting the cheaper antivirus software of B. If 
the C-user originally intending to purchase product A clicks on the advertisement, he 
would be redirected to the webpage of B. There he would be offered to purchase the 
software. Advertisers are therefore able to “place their advertisements in front of 
consumers who have already identified themselves as interested in products or services 
similar to theirs.”61  
The third situation is much similar to the second one. Nevertheless, in order to 
attract even more customers, B would exhibit the trademark “A” directly in the 
commercial message.  
The second and third situation are examples how trademarks may be utilized in 
keyword advertising to deliver contextual advertisements.   
The primary question is whether the trademark protection encompasses use of 
keywords in online advertising. Hundreds of disputes between trademark owners and 
search engine providers and/or advertising competitors ended up in courtrooms around 
the world. Some of the most important cases from the US and EU are analyzed in the 
following chapters.  
2.2.2. AdWords Trademark Policy 
AdWords policy on trademarks has changed a few times since AdWords 
introduction in 2000. Those amendments usually reflected developments in keyword 
advertising case law62. As Google gained confidence about its eligibility to use 
trademarks as keywords, the trademark policy has become relaxed.  
The primary postulate that Google defends is that it is not responsible for the 
keywords chosen by advertisers, because it does not “use” the trademarks itself. Given 
that, Google claims that trademark owners should primarily resolve their disputes 
                                                            
61 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
62 Author´s Note: In Europe the policy was influenced especially by opinion in Google France. 
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directly with the advertisers. The policy says that it is just a Google´s courtesy that it 
“investigates matters raised by trademark owners.”63 
As showed in an example described above, two situations must be distinguished. 
Those situations are (i) use of trademarks as keywords for an online advertising, and (ii) 
direct appearance of trademarks in the commercial message of advertisements 
themselves.  
With regards to the former, Google´ policy states that “Google will not 
investigate or restrict the use of trademark terms in keywords, even if a trademark 
complaint is received.”64 This statement clearly shows the absolute confidence of 
Google of being entitled to sell trademarks as keywords on AdWords. Reflecting case 
law of the ECJ, the strict statement is, however, relaxed in the EU and EFTA region in 
order to fully comply therewith. Even though the policy claims that advertisers have the 
primary responsibility to comply with the Regulation and the Directive in order to avoid 
trademark infringement, it also states that if a complaint is submitted, Google “will do a 
limited investigation as to whether a keyword (in combination with particular ad text) is 
confusing with regards to the origin of the advertised goods and services.”65  
On the other hand, when a trademark appears directly in the commercial 
message, Google says that it “will investigate and may restrict the use of a trademark 
within ad text. Ads using restricted trademarks in their ad text may not be allowed to 
run. This policy applies worldwide.”66 Hence, trademark owners may submit complaint 





                                                            
63 AdWords Policy. Available at: https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/2562124?hl=en. 
64 AdWords Policy. Available at: 
https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6118?expand=reseller&hl=en-AU#reseller. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Author´s Note: This should be analyzed together with another statement that says “Google will not 
restrict the use of your trademark in AdWords text ads unless you submit a valid complaint, even if your 
trademark is registered.” Concerning the EU, I assume that this policy is primarily based on a limited 
liability stipulated in Art. 14 of the e-Commerce Directive. Following this article, Google claims that it 
may be held liable for data stored upon the request of an advertiser only if it fails to remove or to disable 




Below is a list of exceptions when Google allows third parties to show 
trademarks in the commercial message: 
1. Authorization by the trademark owner; 
2. Commercial message uses the trademark descriptively in its ordinary 
meaning instead of in reference to the trademark (for instance 
trademark “SHARP” for televisions would be used as an adjective 
instead); 
3. Advertisement is not in reference to the goods or services 
corresponding to the trademark (for instance trademark term “APPLE” 
would be used to refer to a fruit instead); 
4. Advertisement of resellers and sellers of components, replacement 
parts, or compatible products67; and 















                                                            
67 Author´s Note: However, this section applies only to Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. 
68 Author´s Note: However, this section applies only to Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. 
69 AdWords Policy. Available at: https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6118?hl=en.  
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3. Case Law in the US 
3.1.   Introduction to Case Law in the US 
Disputes involving keyword advertising have developed parallel to the Internet 
and search engines. Before keyword advertising was introduced by search engine 
operators, search results were listed pursuant to keywords placed in metatags, domain 
names and actual text on websites. Metatags are “HTML codes intended to describe the 
contents of the website.”70 The more often a term, which was searched by a C-user, 
appeared in metatags or in the text of a website, the higher was the website listed among 
the search results.71 As businesses started to place metatags that involved their 
competitors´ trademarks on their websites, early lawsuits, such as Brookfield72, between 
the competing parties regarding trademark infringement on the Internet emerged.  
  However, in late 1990´s the search engine operators replaced metatags with 
more accurate systems of algorithms, which monitor primarily the content of websites. 
Thus they stopped to use metatags for ranking purposes. Instead, the search engine 
operators focused on advertisement revenue. Soon after, trademark infringement 
disputes began to concern use of trademarks as keywords for online advertising. Early 
lawsuits were brought against operators of “pop-up ad” technologies, such as in 1-800 
Contacts73, and banner advertisements, such as in Playboy74. Eventually, these were 
substituted by cases dealing with sponsored links placed by the search engine operators 
on search result pages, such as in Rescuecom75.76 
3.1.1. Appellate Circuits 
  The analysis below is primarily based on case law introducing the issue of 
keyword advertising in the US. For the better understanding of the reader, it is 
important to briefly introduce the organization of the judicial system in the US.  
  Federal Courts of Appeals form 13 permanent appellate circuits which 
designate the territorial jurisdiction thereof. The Courts of Appeals are intermediate 
courts, standing between the District Courts and the Supreme Court of the US. The 
                                                            




73 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc. and Vision Direct, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
74 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
75 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
76 LIPTON, Jacqueline. Rethinking Cyberlaw: A New Vision for Internet Law. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
2015. p. 90-91. 
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Courts of Appeals usually follow precedents established by courts within their circuits. 
Thus a particular issue, such as interpretation of “use in commerce” in the meaning 
under the Lanham Act as described below, might be resolved differently among the 
circuits and decisions of the District Courts as well as Courts of Appeals might be 
inconsistent with those reached by courts from other circuits.77  
3.1.2. Lanham Act 
  The Lanham Act (also called the Trademark Act) was enacted on July 5, 1946 
and serves as the primary federal trademark law statute in the US.  
  In order to constitute trademark infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
he (i) has a valid trademark that has been (ii) without his consent (iii) used in commerce 
by the defendant, (iv) in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of the goods or services and (v) such use has been likely to cause a 
consumer confusion.78,79 
  The core of the keyword advertising disputes primarily rested on the 
interpretation of “use in commerce” and “likelihood of consumer confusion” on the 
Internet, which was obviously invented long after the Lanham Act was adopted.     
3.1.3. Communications Decency Act 
  Sec. 230 of the Communications Decency Act (hereinafter as the “CDA”) of 
199680 is a landmark Internet legislation in the US. Sec. 230(c)(1) provides immunity to 
providers and users of “interactive computer services.” It reads as follows: “No provider 
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”  
  The statute explicitly exempts from its jurisdiction inter alia intellectual 
property claims. However, several courts have reached a conclusion that such exception 
applies only to federal intellectual property and Sec. 230 is therefore applicable to state 
claims81. Such approach has also been applied in several keyword advertising lawsuits. 
As described below, this interpretation has been followed to grant immunity to search 
engine providers with regards to state claims concerning trademark infringement.  
                                                            
77 ROSENTAL, Lee, LEVI, David, RABIEJ, John. Federal Civil Procedure Manual. Juris Publishing, 
2014. p. 9-10. 
78 Sec. 1114 of the Lanham Act for registered trademarks and Sec. 1125 of the Lanham Act for 
unregistered trademarks. 
79 U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
80 Act codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
81 Author´s Note: For instance, in case Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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3.2.   Use in Commerce 
  The first prong that needed to be resolved by courts in the US was to determine 
whether online advertising qualified as “use in commerce” under the meaning of the 
Lanham Act. Several courts have addressed the issue throughout the US in the Internet 
context. Opinions have been influenced by, and depended on, the precedents set forth in 
the appellate circuits as well as on the operation of the technology in question in the 
given situation.  
Rise of the Internet-related claims for trademark infringement has led to a re-
examination of the core principles of trademark law, because “the existing trademark 
doctrines failed to provide a clean answer to the question of whether one can face 
liability for “using” a trademark as an information-indexing tool.“82 The reason of 
such failure was likely because the vast majority of cases heard in the pre-Internet era 
concerned defendants who had clearly “used” the trademark as a visible symbols in 
marketing their own products. Hence, courts rarely addressed the issue of limits of 
“use” of trademarks, because they rarely faced claims against defendants whose “use” 
of trademarks did not fit the traditional model of physically placing a trademark on an 
actual product.83  
3.2.1. Playboy v. Netscape84 
The trademark owner Playboy Enterprise brought an infringement action against 
the search engine operator Netscape for alleged “use” of the plaintiff´s trademarks in list 
of terms that were utilized to key banner advertisements for websites of the plaintiff´s 
competitors.  
At that time, the defendant was selling groups of related terms (such as terms 
related to electronics) to advertisers who purchased these terms in order to promote their 
goods and services. Advertisements were displayed as banners, running along the top or 
side of a page with the search results. The banners were usually graphic and confusingly 
labeled or not labeled at all and included a “click-here” button that would forward C-
users to the website of the advertiser.  
                                                            
82 DOGAN, Stacey L., LEMLEY, Mark A.Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use. The 
Trademark Reporter. 2008. Vol. 98. p. 1347. Available at: 
http://www.inta.org/TMR/Documents/Volume%2098/vol98_no6_a3.pdf [accessed on 8. June 2016]. 
83 Ibid., p. 1347. 
84 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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The plaintiff´s registered trademarks Playmate and Playboy were listed among 
the terms related to sex and adult-oriented entertainment.  
Regarding “use” the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit stated that 
overwhelming evidence has been presented by the plaintiff to prove that the marks were 
“used in commerce” in the meaning under the Lanham Act and without permission of 
the trademark owner. However, this plain statement was not accompanied by any 
further reasoning that would explain in details the court´s opinion. Nevertheless, having 
resolved this first prong, the core of the case transferred to a question of existence of 
“likelihood of confusion.”  
Even though the opinion does not provide any guidance how and based on what 
reasons the court reached such conclusion, it established a significant precedent that has 
been followed by courts in different lawsuits several times ever since.85   
3.2.2. Geico v. Google, Inc. and Overture Services Inc.86 
Analogically to Playboy, in Geico the District Court found that search engine 
operators´ utilization of the trademark “GEICO” as a keyword to trigger advertisements 
constituted “use in commerce.” However unlike in Playboy, this case already involved 
Google´s Adwords and therefore provided an important opinion from the up-to-date 
perspective.  
The court explained that both defendants were actively selling rights to link 
advertisements to the plaintiff´s trademark. Therefore, they “used the trademark in 
commerce” in a way that could imply a permission granted by the plaintiff to the 
defendants to do so.87 
The court denied Google´s reasoning that the trademark was used solely within 
internal computer algorithms that determine which particular ads should appear on the 
search result page and therefore such use was for a “pure machine linking function” as 
found in the preceding U-Haul case88. 
                                                            
85 For instance, in case Google, Inc. v. American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. 03-cv-05340 JF 
(RS) (N.D. Cal. 2007) or Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 
(9th Cir. 2011).  
86 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
87 Author´s Note: This was found as a major distinction from the U-Haul case. In U-Haul, the alleged 
“use” concerned use of a trademark in a pop-up advertising software, which allowed advertisers to bid on 
categories of undisclosed terms, which also included trademarks but did not allow them to bid on the 
particular trademarks as keywords directly. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 
(E.D. Va. 2003). 
88 U-Haul Int´l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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Instead, the court relied on opinion expressed in Playboy, but also several other 
cases that concerned “use of trademarks” in the metatags.89 
In order to provide the full picture, the proceedings then focused on the 
occurrence of “likelihood of confusion” which was eventually found by the court in 
situation where the trademark appeared directly in the heading or text of the 
advertisements. However, both sites were then given 30 days to settle and they came to 
a confidential settlement. This left Google and the other search engine operators free to 
continue to sell trademarks as keywords.90  
3.2.3. 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com and Vision Direct91 
Another significant case, 1-800 Contacts was heard by the Court of Appeals of 
the Second Circuit. 1-800 Contacts is a company that sells contact lenses and is owner 
of several trademarks. 
WHENU.com was a marketing company which invented the software, 
“SaveNow.” This software triggered so-called pop-up advertisements that were relevant 
to the Internet activity of a C-user. SaveNow was usually downloaded from the Internet 
as part of a pack of software and required no further specific action by the C-user. It 
monitored words that were typed by the C-user into search engines or that appeared on 
the visited websites. Once the software recognized a particular term, it automatically 
generated a pop-up ad for the corresponding product or service category. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court´s judgment as it followed the 
traditional interpretation of “use of trademark,” which occurs when defendants 
“actually place 1-800 trademarks on any goods or services in order to pass them off as 
emanating or authorized by 1-800.”92  
Furthermore, the court found several other significant differences distinguishing 
this case from previous cases that had dealt with online trademark infringement.  
First of all, the Court of Appeals explained that it was necessary to distinguish 
URL address (www.1800contacts.com) and trademark, because the URL address was 
                                                            
89 Author´s Note: For instance, Marianne Bihari and Bihari Interiors v. Craig Gross and Yolanda 
Truglio, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) or Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 
WL 724000 (E.D. Va.). 
90 HARDEN, Leland, HEYMAN, Bob. Digital Engagement: Internet Marketing that Captures Customers 
and Builds Intense Brand Loyalty. AMACOM Div. American Mgmt. Assn. 2009. p. 82. 
91 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc. and Vision Direct, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
921-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc. and Vision Direct, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), p. 408. 
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included in the internal directory of the software. The URL address itself, though may 
be very similar to the trademark, does not enjoy the same level of protection.  
Second, the advertisements appeared in a separate branded window that popped 
up and thus had no tangible effect on appearance or functionality of the plaintiff´s 
website.  
Third, the court stated that the directory was inaccessible to C-users and general 
public. Thus there was no way of creation of visual confusion with the trademark. 
Unlike search engine providers, the defendant also did not show the content of the 
directory to advertisers and nor could the advertisers purchase a concrete term or 
keyword or manipulate the advertisement that would pop-up. Unlike in Geico, the 
advertisers could not pay to have a particular ad placed on a particular website or in 
connection with a particular trademark.  
According to the Court of Appeals “a company´s internal utilization of a 
trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public is analogous to 
individual´s private thoughts about a trademark.”93 Analogously to Judge Berzon´s 
concurring opinion in Playboy, the court compared a potential profiting from the 
goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff´s website, that led the C-user to such website, to 
a product placement. The pop-up advertisements only informed potential customers, 
who had sought out a specific trademarked term, about other similar available 
alternative products or services that maybe of interest to them.  
For all the reasons mentioned above, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
practice of the defendant did not constitute “use” under the Lanham Act. The court said 
that pop-up ads that do not display plaintiff´s trademarks nor they have any tangible 
effect on the appearance or functionality of the plaintiff´s website, because they appear 
in a separate window labelled with the defendant´s trademark, do not infringe trademark 
law.   
The court explained that in comparison with other cases such as Playboy, 
Brookfield or Bihari, defendant´s activities could not alter or effect the plaintiff´s 
website whatsoever or misdirect the C-users to other websites or change in any way the 
results that the C-user would obtain when searching with the plaintiff´s trademark or 
URL. 
                                                            
93 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc. and Vision Direct, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), p. 409. 
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In its opinion, the court also relied upon conclusions reached by District Courts 
from different circuits in other proceedings heard against WhenU.com and upheld that 
inclusion of the trademark did not constitute “use” of the trademark pursuant to the 
Lanham Act as it was a “pure machine linking function.”94  
Because the plaintiff did not overcome the first prong of a trademark claim, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the claim must be dismissed. 
Besides the foregoing, the court also expressed opposition to some of the 
previous cases such as Bihari, where courts established the existence of “use” based on 
confusion the “use” was likely to cause. According to the court such approach “puts the 
cart before the horse,” as “use,” “in commerce” and “likelihood of confusion” are three 
different and separate elements and therefore “use” must be decided as a threshold95. 
Because this case did not satisfy the very first criteria, the issue of “likelihood of 
confusion” was thus moot96.   
As mentioned above, the court clearly followed the traditional interpretation of 
the Lanham Act, which understood trademark infringement as infringement that occurs 
when a trademark is physically placed on a real product (goods or services) in order to 
pass it off. Since in the instant case the terms were only used in an intern directory and 
were not visible to the C-users, the court explained that WhenU did not utilize the 
trademark in the way that is usually subject to infringement claims. 
The decision itself was welcomed by experts as it involved first thorough 
examination of “use” in the Internet context. This issue had been unclear and thus this 
opinion provided convincing precedent for the future cases throughout the nation. On 
the other hand, to some it seemed that the court narrowed the opinion solely to the 
practice of WhenU.com. Thus, it was uncertain whether the conclusions could have 
been applied on search engines that sell individual keywords. If read for the converse 
                                                            
94 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) and U-Haul Int'l, Inc. 
v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-26 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
95 Author´s Note: However, according to some authors, courts struggle to clearly explain in opinions their 
decision on the commercial use and thus they “could change their approach to discuss the consumer 
confusion issues before commercial use issues (…) that way, if there is not consumer confusion, the court 
would not have to concern itself with the commercial use requirement at all.” [LIPTON, J., op. cit., p. 
92]. 
96 PHILIPS, Jeremy. The Marks at the Limit. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2006. p. 31. 
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proposition (and this interpretation remained open), selling of individual keywords 
would constitute “trademark use”.97  
3.2.4. Google v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory98  
To defeat final demands sent by the defendant to Google, Google filed an action 
for a declaratory relief seeking a declaration that AdWords did not infringe defendant´s 
trademarks. In response, the defendant filed a counterclaim against Google and several 
other businesses, such as Netscape. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory (hereinafter 
the “ABWF”) sued Google for inter alia trademark infringement incurred to ABWF by 
means of selling trademarked terms as keywords to competitors of ABWF to trigger 
sponsored links.  
At the outset, the District Court evaluated up to date case law regarding “use in 
commerce”. Cases in which courts concluded that sale of trademarks as keywords does 
not constitute “use” particularly followed the precedent set forth in the Second Circuit 
judgment 1-800 Contacts99, though 1-800 Contacts background was different as the 
defendant did not allow third parties to purchase specific trademarked terms as 








                                                            
97 GOLDMAN, Eric. Important 2d Circuit Adware Case-1-800 Contacts v. WhenU. Technology & 
Marketing Law Blog. 28. June 2005. Available at: 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/important_2d_ci.htm [accessed on 8. July 2016]. 
98 Google, Inc. v. American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. 03-cv-05340 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. 
2007). 
99 Author´s Note: These cases include inter alia Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 
425 F.Supp.2d 402, (S.D.N.Y. 2006), where the court decided that “internal use of the mark ‘Zocor’ as a 
key word to trigger the display of sponsored links is not use of the mark in a trademark sense;” 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), where the court decided that 
“internal use of plaintiff’s trademark to trigger sponsored links is not a use of a trademark within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act, (…) because there is no allegation that defendant places plaintiff’s 




Contrary decisions in which courts concluded that sale of trademarks as 
keywords does constitute “use” included several decisions of the District Courts from 
various appellate circuits, such as 800-JR Cigar100, Buying for Home101, International 
Profit Associates102, Edina Realty103, J.G. Wentworth104 or Geico.  
Eventually, the court followed the precedent existing in the Ninth Circuit that 
was established by the Court of Appeals in Playboy. The court explained that even 
though it was not explicitly stated therein, the court in Playboy had clearly concluded 
that Netscape used Playboy´s trademarks in commerce.  Although both cases were 
slightly different, most remarkably in the instant case Google identified sponsored links 
as such, while in Playboy banner advertisements were either labeled confusingly or not 
at all, this had no effect to the requirement of “use in commerce”, but rather to 
occurrence of “likelihood of confusion” instead. 
The court concluded that unless the Court of Appeals in Playboy deemed all the 
preconditions for “use in commerce” as satisfied, the court would not have conducted 
such a lengthy and unnecessary analysis of occurrence of “likelihood of confusion”105. 
In the instant case the court explained that “both the majority and concurring opinions 
in Playboy focus on the likelihood-of confusion analysis, indicating the Ninth Circuit’s 
sense of where the legal issue in that case lay; nothing in the majority’s discussion of 
the relevant facts suggests that it questioned whether the plaintiff had shown that there 
was a use of its trademark in commerce.”106  
Regarding “likelihood of confusion,” the court decided in favor of the ABWF 
too. However, both parties have eventually entered into a mutual settlement and 
dismissed their allegations, which was considered as a major victory for Google. 
Moreover, the terms of the settlement did not include acceptance of liability or 
                                                            
100 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F.Supp.2d 273, (D.N.J. 2006). The court adjudicated that 
“use” was constituted in the following three ways: “First, by accepting bids from those competitors of JR 
desiring to pay for prominence in search results, GoTo trades on the value of the marks. Second, by 
ranking its paid advertisers before any ‘natural’ listings in a search results list, GoTo has injected itself 
into the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential customers away from JR to JR’s competitors. 
Finally, through the Search Term Suggestion Tool, GoTo identifies those of JR’s marks which are 
effective search terms and markets them to JR’s competitors.” This characteristic is very similar, if nor 
the same, as implemented by Google in AdWords and Keyword Suggestion Tool.  
101 Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.Supp.2d 310, (D.N.J. 2006). 
102 International Profit Associates, Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F.Supp.2d 672, 677 n.3, (N.D. III. 2006). 
103 Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSOnline.Com, unpublished in F.Supp.2d, (D. Minn. 2006). 
104 J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C v. Settlement Funding LLC, unpublished in F. Supp., (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
105 Author´s Note: The same would apply to Brookfield case.  




wrongdoing or any compensation provided to the ABWF whatsoever. The only 
obligation of Google was not to make a material change in the AdWords trademark 
policy to ABWF´s adverse effect.107 The settlement was reached presumably due to 
unbearable litigation costs for ABWR and another ongoing litigation against Google 
involving the same allegations commenced by economically stronger American 
Airlines.  
The decision showed inconsistency in interpretation of “use in commerce” 
between the Ninth and the Second Circuit. While courts in the Ninth Circuit seemed to 
have resolved this issue for the upcoming cases within the Ninth Circuit once and for 
all, the Second Circuit remained to follow the precedent set forth in 1-800 Contacts. For 
this reason, the upcoming Second Circuit´s Court of Appeals decision in Rescuecom 
was expected by many legal experts and businesses as one that could bring more clarity 
into the issue.108  
3.2.5. Rescuecom v. Google109 
A lawsuit was brought by a computer service franchising company Rescuecom 
against Google for infringing its trademark. Analogously to previous cases, Google 
recommended, offered and sold Rescuecom´s trademark to its competitors as a search 
term that triggered advertisements and links to their websites.   
The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit110 found two major distinctions from 
1-800 Contacts, which led the court to partially override its previous precedent. 
First, in 1-800 Contacts the trademarks were not sold, exhibited or used in any 
other way at all. The search term that was traded was the URL address, which is often 
similar to trademarks, but does not enjoy trademark protection. 
And second, in 1-800 Contacts advertisers could not request or purchase a 
particular term as the content of the directory was not provided to the public. Neither 
could they manipulate in any way which advertisement would be showed. Last but not 
                                                            
107 AUCHARD, Eric. Trademark plaintiff drops suit vs. Google over ads. Reuters. 4. September 2007. 
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-trademark-idUSN0336124420070904 [accessed 
on 8. June 2016]. 
108 GOLDMAN, Eric. Google Gets Mixed Bag in Latest Ruling in American Blinds Case. Technology & 
Marketing Law Blog. 19. April 2007. Available at: 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/04/google_gets_mix.htm [accessed on 8. June 2016]. 
109 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
110 Author´s Note: The District Court dismissed the action, following the precedent of the Second Circuit 
set forth in 1-800 Contacts. 
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least, the defendant did not sell single keywords, but categories of subject-associated 
terms instead.   
Google argued with the Second Circuit District Courts´ cases S&L Vitamins111 
and Merck & Co., where inclusion of a term into its internal directory was not 
considered as “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act. However, as the court stated, 
Google not only enlisted the plaintiff´s trademark in the directory, but also actively 
recommended and sold the trademark to competitors, which cannot qualify as an 
internal utilization.  
Further Google argued that his practice was analogical to a product placement. 
However, according to the Court of Appeals, product placement may escape liability on 
a case by case basis, because it does not necessarily cause consumer confusion, not 
because it does not constitute “use in commerce.”  
The court noted that if it followed Google´s argumentation, no matter how 
confusing the advertisement was, search engine could not be found liable for a 
trademark infringement, because the necessary precondition of “use in commerce” of 
the trademark would not be satisfied. Such approach could be easily misused by the 
search engine operators in order to maximize the advertising effect. For instance, the 
search engine operators would be entitled to list sponsored links as unlabeled among the 
organic results or could automatically redirect C-users to advertisers´ websites when 
they enter the trademark as a search term. Such approach “is surely neither within the 
intention nor the letter of the Lanham Act (…) and surely not beyond judicial review 
merely because it is engineered through the internal workings of a computer 
program.”112  
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals adjudicated that Google´s 
utilization of trademarked terms did qualify as “use in commerce” and vacated the 
District Court´s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Shortly after, 
Rescuecom dismissed the complaint without achieving any concessions from Google113.  
                                                            
111 S & L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F.Supp.2d 188, (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
112 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 2009), p. 130, 141. 
113 Author´s Note: According to Rescuecom´s press release, Rescuecom was satisfied because it has 
achieved two of three major things initially sought for and that is (i) removal of Rescuecom from the 
Keyword Suggestion Tool and (ii) change in Google´s policy to forbid the display of trademarks in the 
text of the sponsored link. [Rescuecom Press Release. Available at: http://www.rescuecom.com/news-
press-releases/a-case-of-david-versus-googleiath.aspx (accessed on 8. June 2016)].  
However, both happened years before the judgment was rendered and therefore some commentators 
saw the abandonment as plaintiff´s reaction that sought to avoid making of contradicting defense-side 
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The decision significantly narrowed the opinion in 1-800 Contacts to a very 
specific situation (WhenU-alike) and established a new precedent for AdWords-alike 
programs deployed by the search engine operators. It also jeopardized several District 
Courts´ precedents, which followed the opinion expressed in 1-800 Contacts114. Last but 
not least, the judgment harmonized Second Circuit´s approach with that of the Ninth 
Circuit and every other circuit, because no court outside the Second Circuit has ever 
ruled otherwise.115,116 
Reading the court opinions from keyword advertising cases that dealt with the 
liability of Internet intermediaries, it seems that courts in the US have been tending to 
shift the core of the trademark infringement analysis on the “consumer confusion” 
aspect of infringement, rather than the aspect of “commercial use.” While opinions 
usually include lengthy analysis of (non)occurrence of “likelihood of consumer 
confusion,” explanation concerning “commercial use” of trademarks is either none (see 
Playboy) or brief and may seem insufficient to assist with application of trademark law 
to the Internet. According to some authors, such approach may lead to “missed 
opportunities in developing coherent policies for intermediary liability in 
cyberspace.”117  
 
3.3.   Likelihood of Confusion 
The second hurdle that the trademark owners have to overcome is to show the 
occurrence of “likelihood of consumer confusion.”  In order to be able to decide the 
issue of the “likelihood of consumer confusion,” appellate circuits have developed their 
theories or tests, which include factors that are supposed to help courts to reach just 
conclusion with regards thereto.  
Apart from their traditional theories that courts have invented and applied to 
general trademark infringement cases, they have also applied new theories to reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                        
arguments in another on-going trademark infringement lawsuit against Best Buy. [GOLDMAN, Eric. 
Rescuecom Abandons Its Litigation Against Google. Technology & Marketing Law Blog. 5. March 
2010. Available at: http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/rescuecom_aband.htm (accessed on 
8. June 2016)]. 
114 Author´s Note: Such as S&L Vitamins and Merck & Co. 
115 GOLDMAN, Eric. Second Circuit Says Google´s Keyword Ad Sales May Be Use in Commerce. 
Technology & Marketing Law Blog. 19. April 2007. Available at: 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/04/second_circuit.htm [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
116 GOLDMAN, Eric. Important Ninth Circuit Ruling on Keyword Advertising, Plus Recaps of the Past 4 
Months of Keyword Ads Decision. Technology & Marketing Law Blog. 19. April 2007. Available at: 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/03/important_ninth.htm [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
117 LIPTON, J., op. cit., p. 92. 
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specifics of the modern technologies. In most cases, new theories are amended 
traditional theories that attach particular importance to some of the traditional factors, 
while play down the others.   
3.3.1. Playboy v. Netscape118 
As explained above, the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
first prong of a trademark infringement test – “use in commerce” was constituted. 
Therefore, the core of the case switched to an issue of “likelihood of confusion.”  
The plaintiff presented the court with a new theory of “likelihood of confusion,” 
so called “initial interest confusion,” which is a confusion that creates initial interest of 
a consumer in a competitor´s product.119 The plaintiff introduced this theory in order to 
deal with the fact that consumers may immediately realize that they have not reached 
the website they originally sought for. Therefore, the plaintiff needed to prove that at 
that very moment the damage has already been incurred. The court concluded that even 
though the confusion is dispelled before a sale is carried out, initial interest confusion 
constitutes actionable trademark infringement as it capitalizes on the goodwill of the 
mark.  
Applying the new theory, the court agreed with the plaintiff´s argumentation that 
the initial interest confusion is caused as unlabeled banner advertisements appear 
immediately after the trademarked term – keyword is typed in by a C-user and instructs 
the C-user to click on the advertisement in order to be forwarded to the advertiser´s 
website. Due to the initial confusion, the C-user, however, may not be aware of the 
origin of the advertisement and thus he follows the instruction believing that he would 
be connected to the trademark holder´s website. Even though C-users may immediately 
realize that they have accessed completely unrelated website, some of them may be 
satisfied with products or services offered thereon. Obviously, the primary reason why 
the C-user would reach the advertiser´s website is the utilization of the trademark by the 
advertiser.  
                                                            
118 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
119 Author´s Note: The initial interest confusion theory presented in Playboy was very similar to a theory 
successfully applied in Brookfield, which was, however, even more closely associated to misappropriation 
of the plaintiff´s goodwill [MARRA, Joesph. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications 
Corp.: Making Confusion a Requirement for Online Initial Interest Confusion. Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal. January 2005, Vol. 20, Issue 1, Art. 23. Available at: 




Before the new theory was introduced, courts in the Ninth Circuit had applied a 
traditional theory, also called “Sleekcraft eight-factor test”120. Even though the new 
theory suggested that the plaintiff was able to show the “likelihood of confusion” 
sufficiently, the Court of Appeals decided to test the case also by using its traditional 
and well-established theory. This theory is made up of 8 illustrative factors. These 
factors are: 
1. Strength of the mark; 
2. Proximity of the goods; 
3. Similarity of the marks; 
4. Evidence of actual confusion; 
5. Marketing channels used; 
6. Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 
purchaser; 
7. Defendant´s intent in selecting the mark; and 
8. Likelihood of expansion of the product lines.  
However, application of the factors shall be flexible, the list is demonstrative121, 
some may not apply in the Internet context122 and some are more important than others. 
Particularly showing evidence of actual confusion among large number of C-users 
provides a strong suggestion of “likelihood of confusion.”123, 124 
After examination of all the factors, the court concluded that the majority of 
factors favored the plaintiff and reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings. Afterwards, both parties 
settled out of court.125 
                                                            
120 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
121 Author´s Note: Other factors invented in different lawsuits included factors such as what the consumer 
sees on the screen or what is the context [Hearts on Fire Co., LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 2009 WL 794482 
(D. Mass. 2009)]. 
122 Such as likelihood of expansion of the product lines, see Brookfield at p. 1054. 
123 Author´s Note: For instance in 1-800 Contacts, the court explained that “proof of actual confusion, in 
the form of (…) market research survey evidence, is highly probative of the likelihood of consumer 
confusion." 
124 Author´s Note: However, see Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996), 
“Evidence of actual confusion is unnecessary.” 
125 SCHILOWITZ, Elias. Don´t Dare Associate Playboy with Porn: Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape 
Communications Corp. Journal of Science & Technology Law. Vol. 10, Issue 2, Summer 2014. Available 
at: http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/scitech/volume102/schilowitz.pdf [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
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3.3.1.1. Judge Berzon – concurring opinion 
Judge Berzon expressed concern in her concurring opinion that Brookfield that 
served as precedent in the instant case was wrongly decided and one day may be 
reconsidered.  
The problematic issue of Brookfield that judge Berzon pointed out at was the 
fact that Brookfield might have suggested that even clearly labeled banner 
advertisements could cause Lanham Act violation. However, in such case there could 
not be any initial interest confusion. Consumers would never be confused as to source 
or affiliation of banner advertisements or web links. Instead, they would be aware or 
should have been aware of the origin thereof. Labeled advertisements could not resolve 
in any deception of the C-users. Judge Berzon noted that “there is a big difference 
between hijacking a customer to another website by making the customer think he or 
she is visiting the trademark holder´s website (even if only briefly) (…) and just 
distracting a potential customer with another choice, when it is clear that it is a 
choice.”126 
Therefore, the concurring opinion suggests that the opinion of the court is 
limited only to situations in which the banner advertisements are not labeled or 
identified. Labeled advertisements deserve protection and should not be considered as 
violating the Lanham Act. This was demonstrated by judge Berzon on an analogy with 
Macy´s or bookstore´s product and banner placement127.  
3.3.2. Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts128 
Network Automation as well as Advanced Systems were direct competitors in 
business with job scheduling and management software. Following final demand sent 
from Advanced Systems to Network Automation, Network Automation sued Advanced 
Systems to obtain judgment of non-infringement of the defendant´s registered 
trademark, which the plaintiff purchased as a keyword term on Bing and Google to 
trigger advertisements of the plaintiffs´ products. Advanced Systems objected to use of 
its trademark and counterclaimed. 
                                                            
126 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corporations, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004), p. 
1035.  
127 Author´s Note: Judge Berzon made an analogy to a store, Macy´s, where shoppers en route to the 
Calvin Clein section are diverted by prominently displayed collection of Macy´s own brand Charter Club 
and thus may never reach to Calvin Clein´s collection. Judge Berzon suggests that it would be wrong to 
expand the initial interest confusion theory of infringement beyond the realm of the misleading and 
deceptive advertising to the context of legitimate comparative and contextual advertising [Ibid., p. 1034-
36]. 
128 Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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The core of the case was to determine whether the use of the trademark by the 
competitor was “likely to cause consumer confusion.”129 To resolve this issue, the Court 
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit considered application of the Ninth Circuit´s traditional 
Sleekcraft 8-factor test and the Internet trinity or Internet troika developed specifically 
for Internet trademark cases130.  
Factors included in the Internet troika are: 
1. Similarity of the marks; 
2. Relatedness of the goods or services; and 
3. Simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing channel.  
If these factors suggest the occurrence of “likelihood of confusion,” the other 
factors must weight strongly against in order to avoid trademark infringement. 
Like in Playboy, the Court of Appeals clarified that the Internet troika as well as 
Sleekcraft test were not intended to be rigid tests nor exhaustive or binding lists of 
factors for deciding trademark infringement on the Internet. They shall rather be applied 
flexibly in the context of emerging technologies.  
The court decided that Internet troika was applied too rigidly by the District 
Court. It concluded that those three factors did not fit for determining trademark 
infringement in keyword advertising (unlike in domain names), because they failed to 
address several important issues. The crucial issue was that advertisements that were 
displayed on the same page above or next to the link to the trademark holder´s website 
failed to clearly identify the source of its product. This might have led to a confusion of 
the C-user. 
In order to adapt these tests on the current situation and other keyword 
advertising cases, the Court of Appeals eventually “merged” the tests and stated that the 
most important factors were (i) the strength of the trademark, (ii) evidence of actual 
confusion, (iii) type of goods and degree of care, and especially (iv) the labeling - 
appearance of the advertisement.131    
                                                            
129 Author´s Note: The Court of Appeals decided that it constituted “use in commerce” following 
precedents set forth in Playboy (Ninth Circuit), Brookfield and Rescuecom (Second Circuit). 
130 Author´s Note: Internet troika/trinity was firstly introduced in Brookfield and later was applied in 
several cases, especially in Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). 
131 SULAIMAN, Irene. Proving a Likelihood of Confusion Remains an Uphill Battle for Trademark 
Owners in Keyword Advertising Cases. Berkeley Technology Law Journal. April 2014. Available at: 
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Concerning the fourth prong, the Court of Appeals concluded that in order to 
determine the initial interest confusion, it is essential to distinguish between 
advertisements that are labelled, not labelled or confusingly labelled, because clearly 
labelled advertisements might eliminate the initial interest confusion. Hence, this factor 
was considered as the most important. In Playboy defendant failed to clearly separate 
advertisements from generic results. However, in the instant case, even though the 
plaintiff did not clearly identify himself as the source of advertisements, the 
advertisements were displayed separately as “sponsored links” above or next to the 
generic results and were visibly and clearly segregated.  
Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that consumers were more familiar 
with the Internet than they were before, especially in times of Brookfield. Online 
commerce had become commonplace. Although the degree of care of consumers may 
have varied depending on products or services they searched for, it was not true 
anymore that “Internet users on the whole exercise a low degree of care.”132, 133 
Due to reasons explained above, the Court of Appeals removed the injunction 
placed on Network Automation by the District Court.  
Network Automation was an important judgment, because it strongly suggested 
that trademarked terms used as keywords triggering labelled advertisements were not 
infringing trademark law. In addition, the judgment also suggested that previous cases 
regarding online advertising depended too rigidly on particular factors and failed to 
consider the whole picture in the Internet context. Instead of the traditional Sleekcraft 
test and Internet troika, it developed new Internet quadrangle of Sleekcraft factors. This 
judgment narrowed the initial interest doctrine as developed in Playboy and endorsed 
the approach expressed in Judge Berzon´s concurring opinion. Last but not least, it 
undermined the pioneering decision Brookfield issued more than a decade ago, which 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://btlj.org/2014/04/proving-a-likelihood-of-confusion-remains-an-uphill-battle-for-trademark-owners-
in-keyword-advertising-cases/ [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
132 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
133 Author´s Note: The court cited previous case Toyota Motor Sales, where the court explained that C-
users are used to “skip from site to site, ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a 
site’s contents. They fully expect to find some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the 
domain name or search engine summary.” [Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 
(9th Cir. July 8, 2010)]. 
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favored trademark holders and by some was seen as misunderstanding modern 
technologies134. In overall, trademark law experts welcomed this opinion135. 
3.3.3. Rosetta Stone v. Google136 
Rosetta Stone appealed from an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Google for trademark infringement. Rosetta Stone is a company that provides famous 
language-learning software, online services and audio tools. It sued Google for 
infringing its trademarks by using them as keywords to trigger paid advertisements, but 
also by using them within the text or title of paid advertisements. 
Considering existing precedents, Google gave up on disputing that the alleged 
practice constituted “use in commerce.” The only issue at question was whether such 
practice was “likely to cause consumer confusion” about the origin of the goods and 
services. 
Analogically to other appellate circuits, the Fourth Circuit has also developed its 
own traditional 9 factor test for determination of trademark infringement.137 However, 
the District Court examined only three factors as the remaining factors had no relevance 
to this case and provided no help in finding the confusion therein. Those factors were (i) 
defendant´s intent, (ii) evidence of actual confusion and (iii) consumer sophistication. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the limited analysis. It stated that the traditional list was 
not mandatory nor exhaustive and was merely a guide to courts within the Fourth 
Circuit. Concerning the three factors, the Court of Appeals, however, reached different 
conclusion. The Court of Appeals decided that there was enough evidence to create 
question of fact, which means that the case could not have been decided by a summary 
judgment.  
                                                            
134 LEVY A., Paul. Ninth Circuit Decision Protects Keyword Advertising Against Trademark Claim. 
Consumer Law & Policy Blog. 9. March 2011. Available at: 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2011/03/ninth-circuit-decision-protects-keyword-advertising-against-
trademark-claim.html [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
135 GOLDMAN, E., Important Ninth Circuit Ruling on Keyword Advertising, Plus Recaps of the Past 4 
Months of Keyword Ad Decision, op. cit.  
136 Rosetta Stone v. Google, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012). 
137 Author´s Note: The test was established in case George & Co. and includes the following factors: (1) 
the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff's mark as actually used in the marketplace; (2) the similarity 
of the two marks to consumers; (3) the similarity of the goods or services that the marks identify; (4) the 
similarity of the facilities used by the trademark holders; (5) the similarity of advertising used by the 
trademark holders; (6) the defendant's intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the quality of the defendant's 
product; and (9) the sophistication of the consuming public [George & Co. LLC V. Imagination 
Entertainment Ltd., 575 F. 3d 383 (4th Circuit 2009)]. 
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Regarding the first prong, defendant´s intent, the court found that Google has 
changed its policy two times in 2004 and 2009. In 2009 it allowed of use trademarks as 
keywords and even to display them in a limited way in advertisements. According to the 
Court of Appeals, this was intentionally done to increase profit. Google must have been 
aware that it would become subject to number of lawsuits and that confusion was very 
likely to result from such practice. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that this 
factor favored the plaintiff and constituted a genuine issue of fact, which prohibit a 
court from granting a summary judgment.  
Concerning the second prong, evidence of actual confusion, the District Court 
only considered source confusion and failed to consider sponsorship confusion, i.e. 
confusion as to the sponsorship, affiliation or authorization of the goods or services. The 
Court of Appeals noted that even some of Google´s internal studies showed risk of 
confusion if the trademarks were used in the headings or text of advertisements 
themselves.   
Finally, the last prong, sophistication of the consuming public, required trial 
because there was too much questions of fact as to consumer sophistication.  
The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment for 
Google. This was a partial victory for Rossetta Stone. Both sites, however, reached a 
confidential settlement before a new trial before the District Court was commenced. The 
settlement left experts declaring that Google won the AdWords advertising trademark 
fight, because it took out the last major and economically strong trademark holder 
challenging Google´s Adwords138. Even though several other cases addressing the issue 
of keyword advertising have followed, the Rossetta Stone case was by some considered 
as the last serious threat to Google´s AdWords in the US139.  
3.3.4. Infostream Group v. Avid Life Media140 
A lawsuit was brought by Infostream, a company which operates several “sugar 
daddy dating” websites. Infostream inter alia claimed trademark infringement of its 
                                                            
138 GOLDMAN, Eric. With Rosetta Stone Settlement, Google Gets Closer to Legitimizing Billions of 
AdWords Revenue. Forbes. 1. November 2012. Available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/11/01/with-rosetta-stone-settlement-google-gets-closer-
to-legitimizing-billions-of-adwords-revenue/#7003e1985a2d [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
139 GOLDMAN, Eric. More Confirmation that Google Has Won the Adwords Trademark Battles 
Worldwide. Forbes. 22 March 2013. Available at:  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/22/more-confirmation-that-google-has-won-the-
adwords-trademark-battles-worldwide/#1f836e483490 [accessed on 8. June 2016]. 
140 Infostream Group Inc. v. Avid Life Media Inc., 2013 WL 6018030 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
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trademarks, which were allegedly bought as keywords from AdWords by its competitor, 
Avid Life Media, which is an operator of famous AshleyMadison.com website among 
others, in order to promote its own dating websites.  
In this case, the District Court relied on the precedent established in Network 
Automation and stated that clearly labeled and segregated ads might eliminate any 
consumer confusion. The court concluded that labeling and appearance of the 
advertisements and surrounding context on a screen displaying the search-result page is 
the most relevant factor in a likelihood of confusion test in keyword advertising cases.  
Since C-users searching for the plaintiff´s trademarks saw defendant´s 
advertisements next to the generic results, those advertisements were labeled with the 
heading “ads” and none of those advertisements displayed or exhibited the plaintiff´s 
trademarks in their text, the District Court concluded that in the age of Internet the 
plaintiff cannot claim that such use of trademark caused any consumer confusion. For 
those reasons, the District Court granted defendant´s motion to dismiss. 
The case showed how weak the position of trademark owners has become in 
over the last decade in keyword advertising litigation. Apparently several years back, 
the case would not have been dismissed on a motion to dismiss. It showed that if the 
advertisement did not reference the trademark, the chances of trademark owners of 
winning their cases in the US have become desperately low. And surprisingly as 
described below, even in the more complicated cases where the advertisement did 
display the trademarks in a non-comparative way, plaintiffs were not winning either141. 
 
3.4.   Communication Decency Act 
3.4.1. Daniel Jurin v. Google142 
A plaintiff, Daniel Jurin, sued Google for infringement of his trademark 
“Styrotrim.” Google´s Keyword Suggesting Tool recognized “Styrotrim” as an often-
searched term and suggested it to unrelated advertisers. The claim was dismissed as 
defendant´s motion for a summary judgment was unopposed and evidence was 
sufficient to grant the judgment therefor. 
                                                            
141 Author´s Note: Such as in General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley et al, 2013 WL 190056 
(D. Colo. 2014) or Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C. et al, No. 1:2012cv04204 - 
Document 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
142 Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
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It was a very rare final decision in favor of Google. Previously, Google had won 
partly in Geico and Rosetta Stone in the first instance, which was however reversed by 
the Court of Appeals. Other cases very either settled or withdrew by plaintiffs.143   
However, the important part of this case had taken place even before the final 
judgment was rendered. The District Court granted Google several motions to dismiss 
claims of state law infringement. The court introduced broad interpretation of Sec. 230 
of the CDA. This interpretation provided Google a complete immunity from liability for 
information provided by another person. According to the court, Google only provides 
space and platform for advertisements, but it does not create or develop in any way the 
content of these advertisements. Keyword Suggestion Tool only suggests suitable 
keywords; it provides options, but it leaves the formation of the content of 
advertisements on advertisers. This interpretation was later followed by courts in other 
keyword advertising cases, such as Parts.com144 or CYBERsitter145.  
 
3.5.   Recent Cases 
3.5.1. Romeo & Juliette v. Assara 1146 
In one of the most recent cases, laser hair removal company Romeo & Juliette 
sued its competitor Assara 1, which allegedly purchased “Romeo & Juliette” term on 
AdWords. Further the defendant allegedly used another plaintiff´s trademark “Romeo & 
Juliette Laser” in hidden links and texts placed on the defendant´s website in order to 
make C-users believe that the defendant´s services were sponsored by the plaintiff.  
According to the District Court, this conduct was likely to confuse public, 
“because a person searching on the internet for hair-removal services using plaintiff´s 
trademarks stood a strong chance of being redirected to defendant´s website.”147 
Moreover, the defendant´s website involved the plaintiff´s trademark in hidden links 
and texts. For such reasons, the District Court denied defendant´s motion to dismiss. 
Even though there has never been a complete uniformity among courts and 
especially courts of different circuits, the trend has been leaning towards a policy 
                                                            
143 GOLDMAN, Eric. Google Defeats Trademark Challenge to its AdWords. Forbes. 22. October 2012. 
Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/10/22/google-defeats-trademark-challenge-
to-its-adwords-service/#233f1ed6270d [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
144 Parts.com v. Google, Inc., 3:13-cv-01074-JLS-WMC (S.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013). 
145 CYBERsitter LLC v. Google, Inc., 2012 WL 5873650 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2012). 
146 Romeo & Juliette Laser Hair Removal, Inc. v. Assara I LLC et al, 2016 WL 815205, (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
147 Ibid.  
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permitting competitors to purchase others’ trademarks as keywords and forbidding them 
to use the trademarks in the text of the advertisements themselves. Thus, at first glance 
the judgment might seem surprising and possibly changing the trend again against 
search engine providers. However, the existence of confusing inserts on the defendant´s 
website made this case significantly different to those analyzed above. Therefore, it was 
generally considered as consistent with the previous case law148.  
3.5.2. General Steel Domestic Sales v. Chumley, Atlantic Building 
System149 
General Steel brought a lawsuit against its competitor in the prefabricated steel 
building business and its owner, Mr. Chumley, who was also a former employee of the 
plaintiff. The defendant purchased the plaintiff´s trademarks as keywords to trigger its 
advertisements on search engines, such as Google. The advertisements displayed the 
trademarks also in the text of those advertisements. Since the plaintiff held a valid 
trademark, which was “used in commerce,” the key question that remained to be 
decided was whether such display of the trademark was likely to cause consumer 
confusion150.  
In its opinion, the District Court explained that even though the trademark was 
directly exhibited in the text of advertisements, the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient 
evidence in support of “likelihood of confusion.” The court may not adjudicate the 
existence of “likelihood of confusion,” even if it suspects thereof, without clear and 
sufficient evidence that proves it151. The court said that even though evidence of actual 
confusion was not compulsory, it served as the primary factor. Moreover, the degree of 
care that is expected to be exercised by customers of steel housing is very high, as such 
products are expensive and usually bought after a careful consideration. This 
“decreases the likelihood that a customer’s choice would be significantly impacted by 
stumbling across one company’s website before another’s.”152 
Although it is only a District Court´s decision, this judgment was considered as 
another precedent that very significantly weakened chances of trademark holders to 
                                                            
148 SACKS, Ira, RUDENSKY, Rachel. Third Party Purchase of Others´ Trademarks as Search Engine 
Keywords. Marks, Works & Secrets. 17. November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.marksworksandsecrets.com/2014/11/trending-court-policy-on-third-party-purchase-of-others-
trademarks-as-search-engine-keywords/ [accessed on 8. June 2016]. 
149 General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley et al, 2013 WL 190056 (D. Colo. 2014). 
150 Author´s Note: The test of “likelihood of confusion” applied in the instant case was a test of the Tenth 
Circuit established in case Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1998). 
151 Author´s Note: All the more so after precedent established in Network Automation. 
152 General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley et al, 2013 WL 190056 (D. Colo. 2014), p. 19. 
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succeed with trademark infringement keyword advertising claims. Trademark owners 
have very rarely won their lawsuits in a courtroom. In this case, even the appearance of 
trademark in the text of an advertisement in a non-comparative way did not suffice itself 
to win the case. Some experts called the decision as a “devastating loss” for trademark 
owners generally153.  
Moreover, this decision was followed by another in Allied Interstate, where the 
District Court found no “likelihood of confusion” despite the trademark was displayed 
in the text of the advertisement either. The court stated that advertisements were only 
referencing the trademarks in order to identify the plaintiff but not to make any 
association to the defendant´s goods or services. The court explained that the 
advertisements clearly indicated that the advertiser was an adverse party to the plaintiff. 
 
3.6.   Conclusion to Case Law in the US 
One of the very recent, if not the last, pending trademark lawsuits in the US that 
involved keyword advertising was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in May 27, 
2015154. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff, a clinical psychologist Carla Ison, 
did not possess trademark of her personal name, as it had not acquired the secondary 
meaning.155 
The overall result of nearly a decade long era of challenging keyword 
advertising at courts in the US has ended as a partial victory for the search engine 
operators, as no final judgment found them directly liable for trademark infringement156. 
However, no US court has ever clearly endorsed the practice either. The search engine 
operators have either won on other grounds (such as lack of trademark), settled (in vast 
majority of promising cases from the trademark owners´ prospective) or trademark 
owners gave up and dismissed their claims. Therefore, there is nothing that prevents the 
                                                            
153 GOLDMAN, Eric. Suing Over Keyword Advertising is a Bad Business Decision for Trademark 
Owners. Forbes. 14. May 2013. Available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/14/suing-over-keyword-advertising-is-a-bad-business-
decision-for-trademark-owners/#2807a4c869d2 [accessed on 8. June 2016].  
154 Ison v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 3395574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
155 GOLDMAN, Eric. Google and Yahoo Defeat Last Remaining Lawsuit Over Competitive Keyword 
Advertising. Forbes. 2. June 2015. Available at:  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/06/02/google-and-yahoo-defeat-last-remaining-lawsuit-
over-competitive-keyword-advertising/#754bc4193abb [accessed on 8. June 2016]. 
156 Author´s Note: Apart from direct liability, US law also recognises two types of secondary liability - 
contributory infringement and vicarious liability. Case law concerning secondary liability in keyword 
advertising is sporadic. Secondary liability of the search engine operators was denied for instance in 
Rosetta Stone and admitted for instance in Geico.  
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trademark holders from suing the search engine operators over the same allegations 
again in the future. However, as Internet has become used daily by vast majority of 
people, chances of proving the “likelihood of confusion” is significantly decreasing. 
Therefore, I do not personally expect much more attempt by the trademark holders with 
this regard. Besides, suing Google in the US means fighting an army of lawyers and 
spending a large amount of money, a path which not many trademark holders are 
willing to go down. If anything, I suppose that trademark holders will lodge complaints 





















4. Case Law in the EU 
4.1.   Introduction to Case Law in the EU 
Even though not as many as in the US, there has been still a significant number 
of the ECJ cases that involved use of trademarks as keywords on the Internet in the EU. 
Various judgments on the preliminary rulings concerned disputes against search engine 
operators (such as Google), marketplace operators (such as eBay) and competitors of 
trademark owners. As analyzed below, the ECJ decisions on trademark infringement 
varied based on the nature of the defendant.157 
 
4.2.   Google France158 
Google France was the first keyword advertising case that was brought before 
the ECJ. This judgment on the preliminary ruling laid down grounds for deciding 
trademark infringement cases concerning advertising on the Internet in the EU. Since 
then, it has been quoted in number of judgments that were rendered in the following 
years159. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many other trademark infringement cases 
concerning different issues preceded and some of them served as a groundwork for 
Google France160.   
The key proceedings of the joint cases involved Louis Vuitton, a manufacturer 
of luxury goods, which discovered that Google had offered and sold via AdWords its 
trademarks as keywords to third parties. Triggered ads were marked as “sponsored 
links,” appeared above and along the generic results and promoted websites selling 
counterfeit products of the plaintiff 161. The plaintiff filed a complaint for trademark 
infringement, which succeeded before the French regional and intermediate court. 
However, Google appealed to the Court of Cassation (in French the “Cour de 
Cassation”) which stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling in order to clarify interpretation of EU law.162  
                                                            
157 NORMAN, H., op. cit., p. 412-413. 
158 Joint cases C – 236/08 Google France SARL, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA; C – 237/08 
Google France SARL v. Viaticum SA, Luteciel SARL; and C – 238/08 Google France SARL v. CNRRH 
SARL, Pierre-Alexis Thonet, Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL. 
159 Author´s Note: These judgments include inter alia BergSpechte, Portakabin, L´Oréal, Interflora and 
Wintersteiger AG. 
160 Author´s Note: For instance, Arsenal Football Club, Céline, L´Oréal and Others or O2 Holdings and 
O2(UK). 
161 Google France, para. 28-31.  
162 Author´s Note: Apart from the preliminary questions regarding Louis Vuitton case, the French court 
also referred questions to the ECJ from another two cases against Google (see ft. 155), which concerned 
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4.2.1. Rights Conferred by the Trademark 
The primary question was common for all three joint cases. The Court of 
Cassation asked for clarification of the First Directive and the First Regulation163, 
particularly whether it shall be interpreted in a way that a trademark owner is entitled to 
ban a third party from displaying or enabling to display an advertisement for identical 
goods or services164 triggered by a keyword, which is identical with or similar to a 
trademark of such trademark owner and which the third party has selected or stored in 
connection with a search engine without his consent165.   
According to the ECJ, a trademark owner is entitled to prevent any third party 
from using his trademark without his consent if the party (i) uses the trademark, (ii) in 
the course of trade, (iii) in relation to goods or services,166 and, as the court interpreted, 
such use is (iv) likely to have an adverse effect on the functions of the trademark.167  
4.2.1.1. Use of Trademark in the Course of Trade by Search Engines and 
Advertisers 
Right at the outset, the ECJ adjudicated that the advertisers used the trademarks 
in commerce in the meaning of the First Directive and the First Regulation. The court 
explained that as long as a keyword chosen by an advertiser serves as a mean to trigger 
an advertisement, it cannot be disputed that the advertiser uses it in its own commercial 
communication and not as a private matter. The purpose sought by such action is to 
display a commercial message that serves as a link to the advertiser’s own website, 
where his goods and services are offered for sale.168 This conclusion was later upheld in 
BergSpechte169.  
On the other hand, concerning operators of the search engines, the ECJ took an 
opposite position. It decided that Google merely allowed the third parties to use the 
trademarks, but did not use them itself. The court said that “the use, by a third party, of 
                                                                                                                                                        
trademarks registered for travel and matrimonial services. The ECJ considered the cases jointly with 
Louis Vuitton case. In addition to liability of the search engine provider, the liability of advertisers was 
also at issue in C – 238/08. Google France, para. 33-41. 
163 Art. 5(1)(a) of the First Directive and Art. 9(1)(a) of the First Regulation. 
164 Author´s Note: The ECJ narrowed the examination of the preliminary question to identical goods and 
services pursuant to Art. 5(1)(a) of the First Directive and Art. 9(1)(a) of the First Regulation. 
165 Google France, para. 43. 
166 Author´s Note: For a non-reputable trademark, the goods and services must be identical with or similar 
to those for which the trademark is registered [Art. 5(1)(a)(b) of the First Directive]. Reputable trademark 
enjoys broader scope of protection – the First Directive gave member states the option to waive the 
“identical or similar” requirement in their national laws [Art. 5(2) of the First Directive].   
167 Google France, para. 49. 
168 Ibid., para. 51-52.  
169 BergSpechte, para. 18.  
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a sign identical with, or similar to, the proprietor’s trademark implies, at the very least, 
that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial communication.”170 Even 
though search engine providers do conduct business activities and pursue profit by 
means of keyword advertising, they only facilitate the option for the advertisers to 
purchase keywords, but do not use them themselves. The court concluded that “the fact 
of creating the technical conditions necessary for the use of a sign and being paid for 
that service does not mean that the party offering the service itself uses the sign.”171  
Hence, the ECJ came to the same conclusion in Google France as majority of 
courts in the US, i.e. that Google did not infringe trademarks. However, it surprisingly 
took a different position to “use of trademarks.” Throughout appellate circuits, the 
courts in the US have already reached consensus that both the search engine provider 
and the advertisers “use trademarks in commerce.” The conclusion on non-infringement 
has been based on the second prong, lack of “likelihood of confusion.”  
The decision did neither follow the more traditional analysis applied by 
Advocate General in his Opinion. Advocate General distinguished two types of “uses” 
conducted by Google. First, when Google allows advertisers to select and purchase 
keywords. Second, when Google displays their advertisements in response to search 
carried out by C-users.172 Because both “uses” were motivated by receiving financial 
remuneration for displayed ads, Advocate General concluded that both “uses” have also 
been conducted in the course of trade173.  However, only the latter established a link 
between “use of a trademark” and promoted goods or services174. Finally, Advocate 
General analyzed the last condition, which is occurrence of an adverse effect on the 
functions of the trademark. Even though Advocate General eventually concluded that no 
trademark infringement was found, because „neither the display of ads nor the display 
of natural results in response to keywords which correspond to trademarks leads to a 
risk of confusion as to the origin of goods and services,”175 he clearly relied on a 
different reasoning.  
The consequence of the ECJ approach is that it focused exclusively on “use in 
commerce” and did not provide analysis of the remaining prongs. Even though the 
                                                            
170 Google France, para. 56. 
171 Ibid., para. 57, 59.  
172 Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro to Google France, para. 55.  
173 Ibid., para. 61, 76. 
174 Ibid., para. 79.  
175 Ibid., para. 92.  
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ruling on non-infringement committed by the search engine operator is generally 
deemed as correct, the analysis of Advocate General is by some considered more 
comprehensive, accurate and persuasive. The reasoning of the ECJ relies solely on 
argumentation that search engine provider may be found liable for trademark 
infringement only if it used trademarks “in its own commercial communication”176, 
meaning in promotion of its own goods or services.177, 178 
Personally, I find the following issues in the judgment. First, the ECJ has 
thereby unreasonably diverted from its previous case law179. Second, even if the 
requirement to “use” trademarks for its own promotion would be necessary, AdWords 
advertisements certainly do promote AdWords as well. In addition to that, Keyword 
Planner, which recommends the most suitable keywords, is certainly aimed to increase 
efficiency of advertisements, which goes hand in hand with making bigger profit for 
Google too. Last but not least, this ruling shielded Google from review of AdWords and 
left space for future misbehavior. Since AdWords does not satisfy the first requirement 
for trademark infringement, Google cannot be investigated for causing consumers 
confusion. This could be misused by the search engine operators, which could possibly 
cause confusion by automatically redirecting C-users to advertisers’ websites or by 
including advertisements directly in the natural results of searches180.   
4.2.1.2. Use of Trademark in Relation to Goods and Services   
Because Google did not “use” trademarks in the course of trade, analysis of the 
remaining prongs concerned only advertisers.   
                                                            
176 Author´s Note: Commercial communication is not defined neither in the First Directive nor in the First 
Regulation. It is, however, defined in the e-Commerce Directive as “any form of communication designed 
to promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a company, organization or person 
pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a regulated profession.” Art. 2(f) of the 
e-Commerce Directive. 
177 Author´s Note: This opinion is for instance expressed in Harvard Law Review, vol. 124, December 17, 
2010. Available at: http://harvardlawreview.org/2010/12/european-court-of-justice-holds-that-search-
engines-do-not-infringe-trademarks-ae-joined-cases-c-23608-c-23708-c-23808-google-france-sarl-v-
louis-vuitton-malletier-sa-2010-ecj-eur-l/. 
178 Author´s Note: Naturally, Google welcomed the judgment in its favour. Official statement made by 
Google´s Senior Litigation Counsel Dr. Harjinder S. Obhi is available at: 
https://googleblog.blogspot.cz/2010/03/european-court-of-justice-rules-in.html. 
179 Author´s Note: In UDV North America Inc. v. Brandtraders NV, C-62/08, para. 43, the ECJ 
concluded: “In light of those conditions for application, the fact that the third party at issue uses a sign 
which is identical with a registered mark in relation to goods which are not its own goods, in that it does 
not have title to them, is not relevant and can therefore not mean by itself that that use does not fall under 
the concept of ‘use’ for the purpose of Art. 9(1) of the Regulation No. 40/94.” 
180 Author´s Note: This danger was also mentioned in Rescuecom. 
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Regarding “use” of trademarks “in relation to goods and services which are 
identical with those for which the trademark is registered,”181 the ECJ was asked to 
decide if trademark infringement required that the trademark was showed directly in the 
advertisement itself.  
In preceding case Arsenal Football Club, the ECJ already decided that “use in 
relation to goods and services” is established by affixing a sign identical to the 
trademark onto goods and (i) offering of the goods, (ii) importing or exporting of the 
goods, or (iii) use of the sign on business papers and in advertising182. However, the 
ECJ noted that this list is not exhaustive, because it was adopted prior to emergence of 
an online advertising. For that reason, the ECJ explained that absence of a direct display 
of a trademark in a commercial message or an advertisement itself does not necessarily 
mean that such trademark is not “used in relation to goods and services.” If a trademark 
is selected as a keyword by an advertiser for the purpose of offering C-users an 
alternative to goods or services of a trademark holder, the trademark must be considered 
as used in relation to the goods or services of that advertiser.183 
4.2.1.3. Adverse Effect on the Functions of the Trademark 
The last prong left to be analyzed was “an adverse effect on the functions of the 
trademark.” Even though this feature is not explicitly stipulated by the secondary law of 
the EU, in Arsenal Football Club184 the ECJ concluded that in case of so called “double 
identity,”185 the privilege granted to the trademark owner in a form of an exclusive right 
to ban other parties from using his trademark, was primarily established to protect the 
holder´s specific interests as the trademark owner, i.e. to ensure that the trademark is 
capable of delivering its functions. Unless any of the function is affected or likely to be 
affected by the unauthorized “use,” the trademark holder is not entitled to invoke this 
right. The ECJ has recognized several functions of trademarks, which were also 
introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, however the function of indicating origin 
and the advertising function were the most relevant to this case.186, 187  
                                                            
181 Art. 5(1)(a) of the First Directive. 
182 Art. 5(3) of the First Directive and Arsenal Football Club, para. 41.  
183 Google France, para. 69-70; also previously in O2 Holdings and O2(UK) and L´Oréal and Others. 
184 Arsenal Football Club, para. 51, 54. 
185 Author´s Note: The term was used in Interflora to describe situation under Art. 5(1)(a) of the First 
Directive, where “use by a third party of a sign identical with the trade mark is made in relation to goods 
or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered.” 
186 Google France, para. 75, 77, 81. 
187 Author´s Note: According to para. 54 of the Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro to 
Google France, the function of indication of origin is the most essential one.  
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An adverse effect on the function of indication of origin occurs if an 
advertisement does not allow or allows with difficulties “normally informed and 
reasonably attentive internet users”188 to distinguish the source of the goods and 
services advertised189 and therefore is able to “cause a confusion” of a C-user, whether 
there is a material link in the course of trade between the advertised goods or services 
and the trademark holder.190  
The ECJ stated that it remains on the national courts to decide each case 
individually and consider whether the facts of the dispute before the court imply adverse 
effect, or a risk thereof, on the function of indication origin191.  
Hence, national courts have received only a broad interpretation of the 
respective provision. I personally find it unfortunate. At the time, keyword advertising 
was already common practice across the EU. Moreover, most of the search engine 
providers used very similar patterns to deliver online advertisements. For those reasons 
it appears to me as unnecessary to leave space for diverse interpretation and application 
of the preliminary ruling in the future judgments rendered over the same allegations by 
various national courts throughout the EU. 
Concerning the advertising function, an adverse effect on the advertising 
function occurs if an ad does affect the utilization of a trademark by a trademark holder 
for sales promotion or as an instrument of a commercial strategy192.  
According to the ECJ, a trademark owner is still able to place  advertisements on 
the search engines by purchasing a keyword that is identical to his own trademark. 
Furthermore, a link to the webpage of the trademark holder will still appear on one of 
the top positions among the generic results. This means that the appearance of the link 
to C-users searching for the trademark is secured, regardless of whether or not the 
                                                            
188 Google France, para. 84. 
189 Author´s Note: The ECJ quoted judgment Céline, stating that “the function of indicating the origin of 
the mark is adversely affected if the ad does not enable normally informed and reasonably attentive 
internet users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to 
by the ad originate from the proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it 
or, on the contrary, originate from a third party.” 
190 Author´s Note: The ECJ further highlighted the requirements on transparency of advertisements on the 
Internet set out in Art. 6 of the e-Commerce Directive, which stipulates that “(…) Member States shall 
ensure that commercial communications which are part of, or constitute, an information society service 
comply at least with the following conditions: (b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the 
commercial communication is made shall be clearly identifiable (…).” 
191 Google France, para. 88. 
192 Ibid., para. 92. 
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trademark owner successfully purchased and placed his advertisement on one of the 
highest position among the ‘sponsored links’.  
For the foregoing reasons, the ECJ concluded that using trademarks as keywords 
for an online advertising does not have an adverse effect on the advertising function of 
the trademarks.193  
4.2.2. Liability of the Search Engine Provider   
The last part of the preliminary ruling concerned the liability of a search engine 
provider under the Art. 14 of the e-Commerce Directive. The Court of Cassation asked 
the ECJ whether a search engine qualifies as an information society service that storages 
data supplied by an advertiser. If affirmative, the search engine provider might have 
been held liable for data stored upon request of advertisers only if it failed to remove or 
to disable access to those data without delay after notification of the unlawful conduct 
of the advertiser is received.194 
The ECJ held that the search engine provider fits the definition of the 
information society service195. However, in order to enjoy the limited liability, the 
activity of the search engine provider must be of a mere technical, automatic and 
passive nature, i.e. that the search engine provider does not have any knowledge of the 
content of transmitted and stored data and neither controls them. For this purpose, the 
court found it essential to examine the contribution of Google and the part it represents 
in creation of the commercial message and in process of picking the purchased 
keywords. Nevertheless, the ECJ concluded that such analysis should be conducted by 
the national courts on a case by case basis as they have the best access to and supply of 
information on each of an individual case.196 
As I have already mentioned in the second chapter devoted to AdWords, I 
assume that this conclusion, considered as favorable to Google, was reflected in the 
current AdWords´ trademark policy. Particularly in the Google´s disclaimer that it will 
commence any investigation only upon received complaint from the trademark holder.  
                                                            
193 Ibid., para. 97-98.   
194 Ibid., para. 106. 
195 Ibid., para. 110. 
196 Ibid., para. 113, 118-120. 
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4.3.   BergSpechte & Portakabin198 
Ever since Google France, the ECJ has not been referenced for a preliminary 
ruling in a case hold between a trademark owner and a search engine provider. Instead, 
the remaining cases involved disputes between trademark holders and advertisers.   
First in BergSpechte and later in Portakabin, the ECJ upheld its holding that 
advertisers “use” trademarks and “use” them “in relation to goods and services” even in 
absence of a direct display of the trademarks in the commercial messages or 
advertisements themselves.199 The ECJ also followed its previous opinion on necessity 
of an adverse effect on the functions of a trademark, though still leaving the final 
decision on the national courts.200 In Portakabin, the ECJ further noted that the 
trademark was used in relation to goods and services regardless of whether the goods or 
services were directly offered for sale in the commercial message or were only available 
on the website of the advertiser, which the C-user was redirected to upon clicking on a 
sponsored link.201     
Nevertheless, unlike in Google France, in BergSpechte and Portakabin the 
advertisers also purchased keywords that were only similar to the trademarks, not 
identical. Therefore, in order to be able to grant to plaintiffs an exclusive right to ban 
any third party from using similar marks to their trademarks under Art. 5(1)(b) of the 
Directive, the ECJ needed to establish that marks, due to their similarity to the 
trademarks and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the 
trademarks and the marks, were likely to confuse public and likely to cause an 
association between the marks and the trademarks.  
According to the ECJ, “likelihood of confusion” represents “a risk that the 
public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same 
undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings.”202 
Following the case law on adverse effect on indicating origin, the ECJ concluded that 
national courts must take into account all relevant circumstances and make a final 
decision whether or not “likelihood of confusion” occurred. However, similar factors to 
                                                            
198 Case C – 278/08 Die BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen und Alpinschule Edi Koblmüller GmbH v. Günter 
Guni, trekking.at Reisen GmbH; Case C-558/08 Portakabin Ltd, Portakabin BV v. Primakabin BV.  
199 BergSpechte, para. 18-19; Portakabin, para. 27. 
200 BergSpechte, para. 21, 30-37; Portakabin, para. 29-36. 
201 Portakabin, para. 43. 
202 Bergsprechte, para. 38; previously also in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer and Adidas and Adidas Benelux.  
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those considered in the adverse effect on the function of indication of origin should 
serve as a guidance to such decision203. 
 
4.4.   L´Oréal and Others204 
Another significant and highly anticipated decision of the ECJ was in L´Oréal 
and Others. Judgment concerned online keyword advertising and sale of goods on an 
online marketplace.  
Plaintiff, L´Oréal, is a manufacturer and seller of perfumes and cosmetics. It 
sells its products through a network of authorized distributors. The defendant, eBay, 
operates an online marketplace, where registered members place products for sale.206 
On the marketplace, a buyer may either bid for products offered by sellers or 
purchase them directly without an auction for a fixed price. eBay charges each seller by 
percentage of an overall value of completed transactions. Apart from general support to 
registered sellers and maintenance of the marketplace, eBay advertise some of the 
products offered on its marketplace on search engines, such as Google.207  
Hence, eBay purchased several keywords identical to the plaintiff´s trademarks 
on AdWords. A typical advertisement included marketing message about the 
opportunity to buy, via marketplace on eBay, goods bearing the trademark that was 
searched for by the C-user. The trademarks were directly displayed in the commercial 
message itself.208 
L´Oréal submitted several allegations to the High Court of Justice of England & 
Wales. One part of these allegations concerned sale of counterfeits and products either 
not intended or released for sale in the EEA. The other part concerned infringement of 
trademarks, which were either displayed on the eBay´s website or purchased as 
keywords to trigger advertisements on Google. For the purpose of this thesis, I will only 
focus on the analysis of the keyword-related preliminary questions.209 
                                                            
203 BergSpechte, para. 38-40; Portakabin, para. 49-54.  
204 Case C – 324/09, originally L´Oréal SA, Lancome parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier 
& Cie and L´Oréal (UK) Ltd. v. eBay International AG, eBay europe SARL, eBay (UK) Ltd, Stephen 
Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox and Ruksana Bi. Later, 
before the ECJ hearing, either settlement was reached or judgment for default rendered against each of an 
individual. 
206 L´Oréal and Others, para. 26-28. 
207 Ibid., para. 28-29, 31. 
208 Ibid., para. 31, 40, 42. 
209 Ibid., para. 33-42. 
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4.4.1. Use of Trademarks in Relation to Goods and Services 
What made this case different from Google France, is that advertisements were 
not purchased by competing businesses, which distribute and sell similar or identical 
goods or services, but instead it was bought by a provider of a marketplace where any 
registered member could offer goods of the trademark holder. As the ECJ described, 
eBay purchased keywords not only to promote its offers of the registered members, but 
primarily also to promote its own service – the marketplace.210 
Therefore, the key question was whether such “use” of trademarks in the course 
of business is made “in relation to goods and services either identical with or similar to 
those for which the trademark was registered.”  
Concerning promotion of the marketplace, i.e. platform entirely dissimilar to the 
goods of the plaintiff, the ECJ concluded that none of these conditions were met. Thus 
protection might have been sought only through alleged reputable trademark 
infringement.211, 212  
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the advertisements also promoted offers 
for sale of goods of the defendant´s registered members. The ECJ held that to that 
extend, eBay “used” the trademarks “in relation to goods and services identical with 
those for which the trademark was registered.” However, prevention of such practice 
may only be claimed if “the use is such that a link is established between the sign and 
the service.”213 In this matter the ECJ followed the standpoint of the Advocate General 
and concluded that in the instant case such link exists. Advertisements purchased by 
eBay created an association between the goods offered by the advertisements and the 
possibility of buying them on eBay´s marketplace.214  
Nevertheless, in order to satisfy all prongs set forth in Art. 5(1)(a) of the 
Directive and 9(1)(a) of the Regulation, a plaintiff must prove that “use” of a keyword is 
able to have an adverse effect on one of the functions of a trademark.215 Based on 
                                                            
210 Ibid., para. 85. 
211 Author´s Note: The scope of protection of a reputable trademark is broader and covers also situations 
in which a third party uses keywords corresponding to the trademark in relation to goods or services 
which are not identical nor similar to the goods or services for which the trademark is registered.  
212 L´Oréal and Others, para. 89-90. 
213 Ibid., para. 92; UDV North America, para. 47. 
214 Ibid., para. 91 -93; Opinion of Advocate General Niil Jääskinen to L´Oréal and Others, para. 89. 
215 Author´s Note: According to the Advocate General Niil Jääskinen, the application of indication of 
origin principle should not be unreasonably stringent, because in the modern times the normally informed 
and reasonably attentive C-user is “capable of understanding the difference between an electronic 
marketplace, a direct seller of goods or services and the commercial source from which the goods or 
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Google France and following cases216, the national court must decide that “advertising 
does not enable reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet users, or 
enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to 
by the advertisement originate from the proprietor of the trademark or from an 
undertaking economically linked to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third 
party.”217,218 
 
4.5.   Interflora219 
Another case that attracted considerable attention was Interflora v. Marks & 
Spencer. 
The Plaintiff, Interflora, claimed trademark infringement of its reputable national 
trademark and Community trademark220 “INTERFLORA” by its direct competitor, 
Marks & Spencer. Both parties competed in sale and delivery of flowers. Marks & 
Spencer purchased several keywords on AdWords, one that was identical to the 
trademark of the plaintiff and others that were either formed of the trademark term with 
minor errors or made up by variations of the trademark and additional words. After 
searching for those terms on Google, advertisements of the defendant appeared among 
the sponsored links. The advertisements did not display the trademark directly in the 
commercial message.221 
Four preliminary questions were submitted by the High Court of Justice of 
England & Wales to the ECJ and concerned two major issues – (i) exclusive right of a 
trademark holder to ban third parties from using his trademark, and (ii) protection of 
                                                                                                                                                        
services originate,” because of large scale of intermediaries that exist in the economy, such as 
“distributors, brokers, auction houses, flea markets and real estate agents.” The Advocate General 
therefore concluded that an adverse effect on the function of indicating origin “cannot be presumed only 
because a link leads to the ad of an electronic marketplace operator if the ad itself is not misleading as to 
the nature of the operator.” Opinion of the Advocate General Niil Jääskinen to L´Oréal and Others, para. 
108. 
216 Google France, para. 99; Portakabin, para. 54. 
217 L´Oréal and Others, para. 94. 
218 Author´s Note: For the overall picture I further note that the ECJ has also uphold its position taken in 
Google France on requirements on an online advertising set out in the e-Commerce Directive (L´Oréal 
and Others, para. 95-96; Google France, para. 86) 
219 Case No. C-323/09. Originally Interflora Inc., Interflora British Unit v. Marks & Spencer plc, Flowers 
Direct Online Ltd., however settlement was reached with Flowers Direct Online Ltd. 
220 Author´s Note: Currently “EU trade mark.”  
221 Interflora, para. 16-19. 
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reputable trademarks.222 For the purpose of this thesis, I will mainly focus on analysis of 
the first issue at question223.  
The ECJ followed its earlier findings in Google France and the following 
cases.224 However, in addition thereto it also provided slightly revised interpretation of 
adverse effect on the functions of trademarks.  
The ECJ highlighted additional aspects implying the adverse effect on the 
function of indicating origin and on the advertising function. The national courts should 
take into account the diversity of a commercial network of the plaintiff, which involves 
large number of retailers varying in size and commercial profile. Under such 
circumstances and in absence of clear information provided in the commercial message, 
it may be particularly difficult for normally informed and reasonably attentive C-user to 
distinguish whether or not the advertiser is part of such a commercial network.225 
Apart from the aforementioned, the court has also brought up an interference 
with the investment function and for the first time provided detailed interpretation 
thereof.  
The ECJ explained that the investment function of a trademark serves as a tool 
to “acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining 
their loyalty.”226 Unlike the advertising function, investment function is not utilized 
solely through advertising, but also through other marketing techniques. A trademark 
owner is entitled to ban “use” of a trademark by any other third party that “uses” such 
trademark in a way that substantially prevents the owner from “using” his trademark to 
acquire and maintain good reputation of his business. Where the trademark already 
enjoys good reputation, the trademark holder is entitled to protect its preservation. On 
                                                            
222 Ibid., para. 20. 
223 Author´s Note: “INTERFLORA” is a reputable trademark. Protection of reputable trademarks is set 
forth in Art. 5(2) of the Directive and 9(1)(c) of the Regulation and is broader [see ft. 163 and 208]. 
Generally speaking, protection to reputable trademarks is granted if use of a reputable trademark is 
without a due cause and detrimental to (i) the distinctive character of the trademark (also called 
“dilution”), or (ii) the reputation of the trademark (also called “tarnishment”) or (iii) takes unfair 
advantage thereof (also called “free-riding”). The ECJ provided interpretation of dilution and free-riding 
and concluded that the final decision shall be rendered on a case-by-case basis by the national courts. In 
short, the ECJ provided broad protection to owners of reputable trademarks. However, it excluded cases 
where advertisers using identical marks explicitly differentiate themselves from the trademark owners and 
offer alternative products, not imitations nor counterfeits [Interflora, para. 72-92]. 
224 Author´s Note: The ECJ held that Marks & Spencer used the trademarks in the course of trade and in 
relation to its goods or services (Interflora, para. 30-31, 33) and because these were identical to those for 
which the trademark was registered, an adverse effect on the functions of the trademark was required in 
order to sustain a trademark infringement (Art. 5(1)(a) of the Directive; Interflora, para. 34, 37). 
225 Interflora, para. 52. 
226 Ibid., para. 60. 
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the other hand, the ECJ said that it may not entitle the trademark holder to prevent any 
third party from “using” such trademark due to the reason that such “use” forces the 
trademark holder to make more effort to acquire or maintain reputation capable of 
attracting customers and preserving their loyalty.227 
 
4.6.   Recent Developments in the Member States of the EU 
The interpretation of the ECJ guidance by the national courts in the EU member 
states diverges. In Austria, the Austrian Supreme Court rendered decision in 
BergSpechte, which was also referred for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. Even though 
trademarks were not displayed in the commercial message, the Austrian Supreme Court 
found the use of trademarks as infringing, because it was confusing. Despite that the 
business name of the advertiser formed the URL address, which was showed in the 
advertisement, the Austrian Supreme Court ordered the advertiser to eliminate risks of 
confusion, particularly by further clarification.228 
In France, courts have traditionally favored trademark owners. This approach 
has been also maintained after the ECJ referrals229. Hence, it appeared as surprising 
when the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. In Auto IES230, the Court of Appeals found 
no infringement committed by advertisers on Google. The court explained that the 
advertisements were not confusing. First, they were separated from the organic results, 
trademarks were not displayed in the advertisements themselves and the domain names 
of the advertisers were indicated. Furthermore, a link to the trademark owner´s website 
was listed on the top of the organic results. Last but not least, below the panel with 
advertisements, the following sentence was placed: “And why not your own 
advertisement?” That indicated clearly that anyone may place his own advertisement on 
the search result page.231  
Finally, in Germany, the most significant case was Bananabay232. It was a 
dispute between two competitors that was referred to the ECJ. Following the 
preliminary ruling, the German Federal Court of Justice (in German 
                                                            
227 Ibid., para 61-62, 65. 
228 LAAN, van der Nicole. The Use of Trade Marks in Keyword Advertising. Developments in ECJ and 
National Jurisprudence. Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Research 
Paper No. 12-06, p. 35-36. 
229 Author´s Note: For instance in Google v. CNRRH, Cour de cassation, IIC, 737 (2011). 
230 Google v. Auto IES, Cour d’appel de Paris, IIC, 744 (2011). 
231 LAAN, v. d. N., op. cit., p. 36-37. 
232 BGH, MMR 2011, 590 – Bananabay II. 
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“Bundesgerichtshof”) concluded that the trademark infringement did not occur. Its 
opinion was primarily based on the labelling, design and positioning of the 
advertisement, which did not contain the trademark and was showed separately under 
the heading “Ads.” According to the court, a normally informed and reasonably 
attentive C-user would assume that the advertisement originated from the defendant and 
that there were not any economic connections between the parties. Before the 
Bananabay ruling, the approach of lower courts was not unified. Some found alike 
situations as detrimental to the function of origin and thus infringing233, while others 
(though minority) ruled in favor of the advertisers234.235    
To sum up this chapter, the ECJ has reached several important conclusions. 
First, the ECJ established that selection and purchase of trademarks as keywords by 
advertisers qualifies as “use in relation to goods or services” in the meaning of the 
Directive and the Regulation. On the other hand, the ECJ denied the direct liability of 
the search engine operators. That narrowed the later disputes primarily to a trademark 
holder – advertiser relationship. With regards to “likelihood of confusion” or “adverse 
effect to functions of trademarks,” the ECJ provided interpretation and guidance to the 
national courts. This guidance was, however, criticized for a possibility of an unduly 
strict application. Even though decisions of the national courts have not reached 
complete unity yet, the majority of the national courts have followed the opinion that 
the requirement of full transparency of the advertiser’s identity might be too difficult to 
fulfill in a short commercial message. Thus in most cases, the courts have refrained 
from finding a “likelihood of confusion” if the advertisements were properly labelled, 
recognizable, the name of the advertiser was displayed at least as part of the URL and 






                                                            
233 OLG Braunschweig, GRUR-RR 2011, 91 – Most; OLG Düsseldorf, GRUR-RR 2011, 94 - Hapimag-
Aktien. 
234 LG Berlin, K&R 2010, 842 – Kontaktlinsen; OLG Köln, K&R 2004, 240 – Primagas. 
235 LAAN, v. d. N., op. cit., p. 37-42. 
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5. US – EU Comparison 
The most significant difference between the approach taken by courts in the US 
and the ECJ is the interpretation of “use in commerce” requirement. In the US, the 
courts are currently unified in opinions that the search engine operators that sell 
trademarks as keywords “use these trademarks in commerce.” Therefore, upon 
fulfilment of the remaining prongs, search engine providers might be found directly 
liable for a trademark infringement. The ambiguity among appellate circuits that once 
prevailed was taken away by the Second Circuit´s Rescuecom decision.  
The ECJ, however, ruled the opposite. In Google France, the ECJ rejected to 
acknowledge that the search engine operators “use” trademarks just because they are the 
basis of a commercial transaction. The ECJ concluded that permitting advertisers to bid 
on particular keywords, storing keywords and triggering advertisements on the basis of 
these keywords is “operating in the course of trade,”236 trademarks, however, are not 
“used.” According to the ECJ, trademarks are “used” solely by the advertisers. Hence, 
the ECJ denied the direct liability of the search engine operators, regardless of 
confusion that the advertisements are likely to cause or intensity of the adverse effect on 
the functions of the trademarks.  
Concerning “likelihood of confusion,” the courts in the US have not reached 
consensus in criteria determining existence of “likelihood of confusion” in the Internet 
context. Some used the initial interest doctrine, the Internet troika or quadrangle, while 
others used traditional theories established within their appellate circuits. Furthermore, 
the Courts of Appeals has neither categorically concluded that online keyword 
advertising is not likely to confuse C-users. Hence, this issue might again come under 
scrutiny one day. Chances of the trademark owners are, however, becoming 
significantly low.  
The ECJ, on the other hand, has not established any particular theory and instead 
provided broad interpretations to the national courts. Nevertheless, it reviewed keyword 
advertising in terms of impression which C-users seem at first glance. The ECJ focused 
on the confusion that occurs before the purchase of product or service takes place. To 
such extend, the approach of the ECJ is very similar to the initial interest confusion 
doctrine as described in Playboy.    
                                                            
236 Google France, para. 55. 
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In both jurisdictions, the US and the EU, courts have granted search engine 
providers a right to invoke immunity from liability for trademark infringement. In the 
US, the courts have repeatedly granted immunity with regards to state trademark 
infringement claims. In the EU, the ECJ only admitted the possibility to claim immunity 
and left the final decision, whether the exceptions in the concrete situations apply, on 























6. Developments in the Czech Republic 
6.1.   Recent Case Law 
In October 2015, a judgment was rendered in the case Teco v. Seznam.cz by the 
Municipal Court in Prague237. It was a pilot ruling in the Czech Republic that dealt with 
keyword advertising on the Internet, where the complaint was filed against the search 
engine provider. Because the defendant lodged an appeal and the judgment may 
therefore be reversed or revoked by the High Court, I will provide just a brief 
introduction to this case.  
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of Programmable Logic Controllers and smart 
housing systems, sued the leading Czech search engine operator for allowing a third 
party to purchase keywords that were also registered trademarks of the plaintiff on an 
online advertising service Sklik and to place advertisements promoting products and 
services of the plaintiff’s direct competitor. The plaintiff demanded that the defendant 
remove the advertisements and inform the plaintiff of the advertiser. The court 
adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff with regards to both claims. 
The principal question of the case was to resolve whether the defendant had 
passive legitimation in the dispute or whether the passive legitimation was borne solely 
by the advertiser.  
The court concluded that purchase of the trademarks as keywords for an online 
advertising constituted “use of those trademarks in the course of trade” for goods or 
services which were identical with those for which the trademarks were registered. That 
is explicitly forbidden by Sec. 8(2) of the Act on Trademarks238. 
Further, the court also concluded that the defendant´s services were utilized in 
the course of the trademark infringement. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to seek 
protection according to Sec. 4(3) of Act No. 221/2006 Coll., on Enforcement of 
Industrial Property Rights, which gives the trademark holder right to seek a court 
decision also on claims against any person whose means and services were used by 
third persons for the trademark infringement, i.e. also againt the search engine provider. 
Accordingly, Sec. 3(1)(c) of the Act on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights also 
gives the right to the trademark owner to require certain information (such as 
                                                            
237 Teco a.s. v. Seznam.cz, a.s., Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague, 6 October, 2015, No. 21 Cm 
8/2015. 
238 Author´s Note: The same conclusion was reached in Google France, para. 71.   
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identification data of the advertiser) towards the search engine provider, which for the 
purpose of economic benefit provided services that were used in the course of the 
infringing activities239. 
Although the defendant invoked immunity provided by Sec. 3 – 6 of Act No. 
480/2004 Coll., on Certain Information Society Services, which implements the e-
Commerce Directive, the court explained that such immunity may not be granted once 
the search engine operator was explicitly notified of the infringing conduct of the 
advertiser240. Moreover, the plaintiff did not primarily invoked the defendants liablity 
for the content of the advertisements, but demanded to remove the consequences of the 
infringement conducted by a third party in accordance with the Act on Enforcement of 
Industrial Porperty Rights. Only secondarily, the plaintiff reproached the defendant for 
failure to remove the advertisements upon his written notification.  
Eventually the court explained that it is the advertiser, who undoubtedly bears 
the liability for a trademark infringement. However, the plaintiff may not know the 
identity of the advertiser. In case that the search engine provider refuses to provide 
information that would identify the advertiser, it is in compliance with the respective 
legal provisions and general legal principles, such as prohibition to benefit from 
unlawful state or obligation of prevention, to seek remedy against the search engine 
provider itself.   
In my view, the Municipal Court followed case law of the ECJ and denied direct 
liability of the search engine provider. Instead, it applied secondary liability that is set 
forth in the Act on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights. Since national courts of 
the member states interpret differently what constitutes adverse effect on the functions 
of trademarks, the conclusion of the court that the advertiser in the instant case infringed 
the trademarks might also serve as a guideline for future keyword advertising cases in 
the Czech Republic.   
 
 
                                                            
239 Author´s Note: The right to require information on the advertiser is also established by Art. 6b(2) of 
Act No. 40/1995 Coll., on Advertising Regulation. 
240 Author´s Note: The same conclusion was reached in Google France, para. 120.  
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6.2.   Protection Provided by Law Against Unfair Competition 
Besides the general trademark law protection against the trademark infringement 
established by the Act on Trademarks and the Act on Enforcement of Industrial 
Property Rights, trademark owners as well as third parties may also invoke protection 
provided for by law against unfair competition, which is stipulated in Sec. 2976 et seq. 
of Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code241. This protection exists in parallel with the 
trademark law protection. In order to defend his claims, a plaintiff may invoke either of 
them or both242. The High Court in Prague has previously ruled that “Although the right 
of an owner to protection of the right arising from a trademark and the right of a 
competitor to protection against unfair competition are separate legal titles that are 
based on different substantive legislation, it is necessary to take into account that if the 
interference occurs with the right to the trademark and both, the harmed party and the 
violator are competitors, the infringement of the rights may be considered as unfair 
competition”243. The principal distinction is that protection provided by unfair 
competition rules is much broader and applies not only to registered, but also to 
unregistered marks.  
The general clause of unfair competition reads as follows: “If, in business 
relations, a person gets into conflict with good morals of competition as a result of his 
conduct capable of causing harm to other competitors or customers, such a person has 
competed unfairly. Unfair competition is prohibited“244. The typified cases of unfair 
competition that are applicable to trademarks are among others misleading advertising, 
misleading identification of goods and services, creation of likelihood of confusion and 
free-riding on the reputation. The plaintiff may request the defendant to refrain from 
competing unfairly or to remove a defective state. In addition, he may also request 
adequate satisfaction, compensation for damage and restitution of unjust enrichment245. 
 
 
                                                            
241 Author´s Note: The protection of industrial rights against unfair competition was firstly established by 
Sec. 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. With regards to a particular 
use of trademarks on the Internet, the Joint Recommendation provides for a sample rules for protection of 
trademarks thereon.   
242 Author´s Note: This conclusion was acknowledged in MAFRA, a.s.  v. Mladá fronta a.s., Judgment of 
the Supreme Court, 30 May, 2012, No. 23 Cdo 4948/2010. 
243 Judgment of the High Court in Prague, 13 September, 2005, No. 3 Cmo 41/2005. 
244 Sec. 2976(1) of the Civil Code.  




The purpose of this thesis was to provide an overall analysis of both transatlantic 
approaches to the use of trademarks in keyword advertising246.  
Case law in the US is not completely unified and some decisions of lower courts 
are inconsistent. Appellate circuits have already reached consensus that search engines 
“use trademarks in commerce” and their liability therefore may be established. 
Nevertheless, the second prong, i.e. confusion that was likely to be caused by such use, 
has been evaluated based on criteria that vary significantly among different circuits. 
Moreover, the courts have struggled to face the determination of “likelihood of 
confusion” in the Internet context. It is obvious that this issue lacks an opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the US. However, despite certain inconsistencies, the courts have 
been clearly leaning towards the protection of the search engine operators and 
advertisers. Even though the issue is not considered as decided conclusively, the 
chances of trademark owners to reverse case law in their favor are deemed to be 
significantly low.  
In the EU, the ECJ concluded that the purchase of trademarks as keywords 
constitutes "use" under the European law. However, the person who “uses” the 
trademark is the advertiser, not the search engine provider. Hence, the direct liability of 
the search engine providers was rejected. Secondary liability may be established by 
national laws of the member states, such as by unfair competition law.  
Therefore, only the advertisers may be found directly responsible for 
infringement of trademarks in keyword advertising. It must be assessed on a case by 
case basis whether their advertisements interfere with the function of indicating origin 
or the investment function of the trademark. The final conclusion depends particularly 
on the content and appearance of the commercial message. However, national courts 
have applied different interpretations of the ECJ guidance and thus there still remains 
scope for further clarification in any of the future referrals for a preliminary ruling.      
Immunity from liability has been granted to search engine providers in both 
jurisdictions. In the US, the exemption applies to state trademark infringement claims 
based on the CDA. In the EU, immunity provided for by the e-Commerce Directive 
                                                            
246 Author´s Note: Obviously, case law concerning this issue exists in other countries as well. Most 
remarkably in Australia, where Google was subject to several disputes. One of the most important 
decision and win for Google was Google v. ACCC, Case No. S175/2012, 6 February, 2013. 
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may be invoked until the search engine provider is notified of the infringing conduct by 
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Abstract in English 
Use of trademarks as keywords for searching the Internet  
The purpose of this thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the use of trademarks 
as Internet search engine keywords to trigger advertisements that are displayed on 
search result pages. The main part of the thesis is devoted to legislation and case law in 
the US. However, for the comparative purposes, I also address developments 
concerning keyword advertising in the EU. I chose this topic because it combines 
traditional elements of law with modern technologies. Moreover, despite its significant 
economic and legal impacts, I consider this topic as insufficiently researched in the 
Czech Republic.  
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter is devoted to a general 
introduction to trademarks, including the history of trademarks, current legal definitions 
of trademarks as well as legal frameworks of trademarks law. This chapter also focuses 
on an element of trademark distinctiveness and analyses functions of trademarks. Last 
but not least, it also describes basic classifications of trademarks and provides their 
examples. 
The second chapter introduces the issue of keyword advertising. It focuses on a 
description of the operation of Internet search engines, keyword advertising programs 
and AdWords´ current policy.   
The third chapter concentrates on the development of case law concerning 
keyword advertising in the US. The development is described in two key elements of 
trademark infringement in the US, i.e. “use of a trademark in commerce” in a way that 
is “likely to cause a consumer confusion.”   
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the development of case law concerning 
keyword advertising in the EU. The analysis is primarily focused on preliminary rulings 
of the ECJ and subsequent rulings of national courts of member states of the EU. 
The fifth chapter provides a brief comparison of both transatlantic approaches.  
The sixth, and also last, chapter concentrates on the recent pilot ruling regarding 
keyword advertising in the Czech Republic and briefly introduces protection of 





Abstrakt v českém jazyce 
Užití ochranných známek jako klíčových slov při vyhledávání na 
internetu  
Cílem této diplomové práce je komplexní analýza používání ochranných známek 
jako klíčových slov při vyhledávání na internetu pro zobrazení reklamy na stránkách 
internetových vyhledávačů s výsledky vyhledávání. Hlavní část práce je věnována 
legislativě a judikatuře v USA. Nicméně za účelem vzájemného srovnání se zabývám 
též vývojem judikatury týkající se reklamy na internetu v EU. Toto téma jsem si vybral, 
neboť propojuje tradiční právní institut s moderními technologiemi a navzdory jeho 
významných ekonomických a právních dopadům ho považuji v České republice za 
nedostatečně prozkoumané.  
Tato práce se skládá ze šesti kapitol. První kapitola je věnována uvedení čtenáře 
do problematiky ochranných známek, a to včetně jejich historie, současné zákonné 
definice, jakož i právního rámce vymezujícího právo ochranných známek. Tato kapitola 
se rovněž zaměřuje na prvek rozlišovací způsobilosti ochranných známek a analyzuje 
jejich funkce. V neposlední řadě také přibližuje základní dělení ochranných známek a 
poskytuje jejich praktické příklady. 
Druhá kapitola představuje problematiku reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových 
slov. Zaměřuje se na popis fungování internetových vyhledávačů, programů 
zajišťujících reklamu pomocí klíčových slov a současné zásady pro užívání služby 
AdWords.  
Třetí kapitola se zaměřuje na vývoj judikatury týkající reklamy prostřednictvím 
klíčových slov v USA. Vývoj je znázorněn na dvou klíčových prvcích porušení 
ochranné známky v USA, tj. „užívání ochranné známky v obchodním styku“ způsobem, 
který je „způsobilý vyvolat nebezpečí záměny“.  
Čtvrtá kapitola je věnována vývoji judikatury týkající reklamy prostřednictvím 
klíčových slov v EU. Analýza se zaměřuje především na rozhodnutí o předběžných 
otázkách Soudního dvora a následných rozhodnutí vnitrostátních soudů členských států 
EU.  
Pátá kapitola obsahuje stručné srovnání obou transatlantických přístupů. 
Šestá a zároveň poslední kapitola přibližuje nedávné průlomové rozhodnutí 
týkající se reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových slov v České republice a stručně 
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představuje ochranu práv k ochranným známkám poskytovanou prostřednictvím práva 





























Teze v českém jazyce 
1. Úvod  
Ochranné známky tvoří součást práva duševního vlastnictví. Jejich primárním 
úkolem ovšem není ochrana výsledků tvůrčí nebo vědecké činnosti, ale vytvoření 
komunikačního kanálu mezi výrobcem či poskytovatelem služeb na jedné straně a 
koncovým zákazníkem na straně druhé. Díky ochranným známkám jsou spotřebitelé 
schopni okamžitě rozlišit výrobky jednoho původce od druhého, což jim umožňuje 
opakovaně vyhledat a zakoupit produkt, se kterým byli spokojeni, šetří čas a poskytuje 
jistou míru předvídatelnosti kvality výrobku či služby. Stejně tak výrobci mohou 
prostřednictvím ochranných známek komunikovat se zákazníky a využívat právní 
ochrany proti konkurentům k investicím do pozice značky na trhu a zlepšování kvality.  
Se vznikem a rozšířením internetu, jako globálního systému propojených 
počítačových sítí, vyvstaly nové výzvy, kterým jednotlivé právní obory, včetně práva 
známkového, musejí čelit. Jednou z těchto výzev je i používání ochranných známek 
jako klíčových slov k internetové reklamě. Hlavním důvodem, proč jsem si vybral toto 
téma diplomové práce, je právě propojení tradičního právního institutu, kterým 
ochranné známky nepochybně jsou, s moderními a rychle se vyvíjejícími 
technologiemi.  
Historie ochranných známek sahá až do starověkých civilizací a její vývoj lze i 
přes některé nové typy ochranných známek označit za konzervativní. I z toho důvodu 
platná právní úprava nepočítala s novými způsoby užití ochranných známek, které 
umožnil rozvoj internetu. To vyústilo v množství sporů, ve kterých byly soudy nuceny 
výkladem překlenout nedostatky právní úpravy a do jisté míry tak spoluvytvořit rámec 
známkoprávní ochrany.  
Nejstarší a nejbohatší judikatura v oblasti reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových 
slov pochází z USA a její rozbor tvoří páteř této diplomové práce. Nedlouho poté se 
ovšem stala tato otázka hojně diskutovanou i v rámci EU, na což navázal ESD několika 
rozhodnutími o předběžných otázkách. V minulém roce bylo navíc vydáno průlomové 





2. Právní úprava ochranných známek 
Ochranné známky podléhají národní, evropské i mezinárodní právní úpravě. 
Současná definice ochranné známky podle § 1 zákona č. 441/2004 Sb., o ochranných 
známkách, říká, že ochrannou známkou může být „jakékoliv označení schopné 
grafického znázornění, zejména slova, včetně osobních jmen, barvy, kresby, písmena, 
číslice, tvar výrobku nebo jeho obal, pokud je toto označení způsobilé odlišit výrobky 
nebo služby jedné osoby od výrobků nebo služeb jiné osoby.“247 Z této množiny 
samozřejmě existuje řada výjimek, jako jsou např. označení v rozporu s dobrými mravy, 
veřejným pořádkem či státní symboly.  
3. Znaky, funkce a dělení ochranných známek 
Podstatným znakem ochranných známek je jejich rozlišovací způsobilost pro 
výrobky a služby, které označují. Ochranné známky mohou mít rozlišovací způsobilost 
samy osobě již ze své podstaty (tzv. inherentní rozlišovací způsobilost). Tyto známky se 
dělí na fantazijní neboli smyšlené (např. „KODAK“), tvořené běžnými slovy a 
označující výrobek, který nemá s významem takových slov žádnou logickou spojitost 
(např. „APPLE“ pro elektroniku) a konečně známky asociační, které sice vyvolávají 
určitou pozitivní asociaci mezi známkou a výrobky, které známka označuje, nicméně 
tyto výrobky nepopisuje (např. „Jaguar“ pro automobily).  
Druhým typem jsou ochranné známky popisné, které požívají právní ochrany 
pouze v případě nabytí rozlišovací způsobilosti neboli tzv. druhotného významu, díky 
němuž označení v myslích veřejnosti primárně identifikuje zdroj výrobku a nikoliv 
výrobek samotný (např. „Coca Cola“).    
Jak již bylo předestřeno v úvodu, ochranné známky plní řadu nezastupitelných 
funkcí. Mezi nejvýznamnější patří zejména funkce označení původu, kterou považuje za 
stěžejní též judikatura ESD248. Dalšími významnými funkcemi jsou funkce rozlišovací, 
funkce garanční, která v sobě nese i silný prvek ochrany spotřebitele, dále pak funkce 
reklamní a investiční. Právě funkce reklamní a investiční byly spolu s funkcí označení 
původu nejvíce diskutované ve spojitosti s reklamou prostřednictvím klíčových slov.    
                                                            
247 Pozn. Autora: Obdobná definice s výjimkou označení v podobě barev platí i pro ochrannou známku 
EU upravenou Nařízením č. 207/2009.  
248 Rozhodnutí Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed, C-206/01 (2002). 
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Základním hlediskem pro dělení ochranných známek je jejich forma. V této 
souvislosti rozlišujeme ochranné známky slovní, obrazové, kombinované a prostorové. 
Širší dělení zahrnuje i známky, které nejsou tradiční součástí právních řádů a jejichž 
ochrana se prosazuje teprve v poslední době. Mezi tyto ochranné známky patří např. 
barva, zvuková či čichová známka.  
4. Reklama prostřednictvím klíčových slov 
Internetové vyhledávače se staly de facto nenahraditelnými nástroji pro 
vyhledávání zboží, služeb či informací na internetu. Uživateli, který zadá příkaz do 
internetového vyhledávače, se zobrazí okno se seznamem výsledků vyhledávání, které 
obsahuje seznam hypertextových odkazů na internetové stránky, které byly pomocí 
automatických algoritmů na základě čistě objektivních kritérií vyhodnoceny jako 
nejvíce relevantní. Tyto výsledky se označují jako „organické“ či „přirozené výsledky“. 
Slova, termíny či fráze, které uživatelé zadávají do vyhledávače, se nazývají „klíčová 
slova“.  
V okamžiku, kdy uživatel zadá příkaz k vyhledání výsledků, internetový 
vyhledávač uživateli zpravidla zobrazí nejen seznam organických výsledků, ale též 
seznam placených textových reklam. Tyto reklamy jsou spouštěny právě pomocí 
klíčových slov. V okamžiku, kdy program pro poskytování reklamy rozezná, že určité 
klíčové slovo, který bylo zakoupeno inzerentem, je vyhledáváno, umístí na stránku 
výsledků kontextuální reklamu. Obsah reklamy je vytvořen inzerentem. Typická 
reklama se skládá z obchodního sdělení a odkazu na webovou stránku inzerenta, na 
kterou je uživatel v případě kliknutí přesměrován. 
V současné době všechny hlavní internetové vyhledávače249 používají vlastní 
programy pro poskytování internetové reklamy, která generuje převládající většinu 
jejich příjmů. Globálně zdaleka nejrozšířenějším a nejpoužívanějším programem je 
v současné době program AdWords fungující při internetovém vyhledávači a 
společnosti Google. 
Na české doméně google.cz jsou reklamy zobrazovány nad, pod a vedle 
organických výsledků. Písmo, jeho velikost i barva jsou shodné s organickými 
                                                            
249 Pozn. Autora: Zejména Google, Yahoo!, Bing či Seznam.  
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výsledky. Reklamy jsou označeny v záhlaví jako „Reklama“ či „Reklamy“.250 Inzerenti 
si mohou klíčová slova vybrat buď sami anebo mohou využít nástroje Plánovač 
klíčových slov, jehož hlavním cílem je navrhnout inzerentům taková klíčová slova, 
která nejvíce přispějí k efektivitě a úspěchu jejich reklamy. 
Přesah do práva ochranných známek spočívá v možnosti výběru takových 
klíčových slov, která odpovídají ochranným známkám třetích osob, a to bez jejich 
souhlasu, a eventuální zobrazení ochranných známek též v obchodním sdělení umístěné 
reklamy. Inzerenti tedy mohou "umístit své reklamy před spotřebitele, kteří již sami 
sebe identifikovali jako zájemce o produkty nebo služby podobné jejich."251 To 
pochopitelně vyvolalo reakci vlastníků ochranných známek, kteří se obrátili na soudy 
s žalobami na porušení práv k ochranným známkám.   
5. Judikatura soudů v USA 
Judikatura v oblasti reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových slov navázala na spory o 
používání ochranných známek v tzv. meta tazích, neboli speciálních kódech určených 
k popisu obsahu internetové stránky252.  
Podle Lanhamova zákona musí žalobce tvrdící porušení práv k ochranné známce 
prokázat, že (i) je vlastníkem platné ochranné známky, která byla žalovaným (ii) bez 
souhlasu žalobce (iii) užita v obchodním styku, (iv) v souvislosti s prodejem, nabízením 
k prodeji, distribucí zboží a služeb nebo reklamou na zboží a služby a (v) takové užití 
bylo způsobilé vyvolat nebezpečí záměny. Jádro sporů týkajících se reklamy pomocí 
klíčových slov spočívalo zejména ve výkladu požadavků na „užití v obchodním styku“ 
a „vzniku nebezpečí záměny u spotřebitelů“.  
5.1. Užití v obchodním styku  
První důležitou otázkou, o které musely soudy v USA rozhodnout, bylo, zda 
užívání ochranných známek jako klíčových slov pro zobrazování reklamy na internetu 
lze kvalifikovat jako „užití v obchodním styku“ ve smyslu Lanhamova zákona. Byť se 
judikatura stavěla zpočátku k této otázce nejednotně, postupem času byl dosažen široký 
konsensus.  
                                                            
250 Pozn. autora: Google aplikuje různé způsoby odlišení reklam od organických výsledků. Výše uvedený 
způsob tak neplatí pro všechny domény internetováho vyhledávače Google.   
251 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc. 
252 Pozn. autora: Například důležité rozhodnutí Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corporation., které bylo opakovaně citováno i v judikatuře v oblasti reklamy 
prostřednictvím klíčových slov. 
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Stěžejním rozhodnutím se z dnešního pohledu jeví zejména rozhodnutí v případu 
Playboy v. Netscape, ve kterém odvolací soud devátého obvodu konstatoval, že 
předložené důkazy přesvědčivě prokázaly, že ochranné známky byly poskytovatelem 
internetového vyhledávače „užity v obchodním styku“ bez souhlasu vlastníka 
ochranných známek. Přestože tento výrok nebyl podpořen žádným dalším 
odůvodněním, které by blíže osvětlilo důvody tak kategorického závěru, založilo toto 
rozhodnutí důležitý precedent, který byl soudy z různých odvolacích obvodů od té doby 
opakovaně následován.  
Důležité bylo zejména potvrzení výše uvedeného ve sporu Geico v. Google, které 
se již na rozdíl od případu Playboy týkalo specificky programu AdWords a poskytlo tak 
důležité stanovisko pro převážnou většinu sporů, které následovaly. Soud zde odmítl 
argumentaci Googlu, že služba AdWords je plně automatizovaný interní proces, a 
naopak konstatoval, že žalovaný aktivně prodával práva k navázání reklamy na 
ochrannou známku žalobce a proto „užíval ochranné známky v obchodním styku“ 
způsobem, který mohl naznačovat povolení udělené žalobcem žalovanému k takovému 
postupu.  
Naproti tomu k opačnému závěru, tedy že žalovaný „neužíval ochranné známky 
v obchodním styku“ došel odvolací soud druhého obvodu v případu 1-800 Contacts v. 
WhenU.com. Toto rozhodnutí se týkalo problematiky tzv. pop-up reklam, tedy 
vyskakovacích oken, které se automaticky zobrazily uživateli internetu v okamžiku, kdy 
vyhledal některé z klíčových slov zahrnutých v seznamech softwaru. Soud aplikoval 
tradiční výklad pojmu „užití ochranné známky“, který chápal jako její fyzické umístění 
na zboží nebo služby za účelem jejich označení původcem. Navíc konstatoval, že 
v situaci, kdy žalovaný neumožňoval inzerentům zakoupit konkrétní klíčová slova a ani 
jim nezpřístupňoval obsah jednotlivých seznamů s klíčovými slovy, se jednalo pouze o 
interní využití ochranných známek. Zobrazená reklama pak informovala uživatele o 
alternativních produktech, což je též podstata obecně přípustné praktiky product 
placement, neboli umístění produktu.  
Byť se případ skutkově lišil od způsobu fungování programu AdWords, založil 
přesto precedent, který byl následně soudy druhého obvodu pravidelně aplikován, a to i 
ve sporech vedených proti společnosti Google253. To vyústilo v rozpornou judikaturu 
mezi soudy druhého obvodu a soudy zbylých obvodů, které jednotně následovaly 
                                                            
253 Pozn. autora: Například v prvoinstančním rozhodnutí Rescuecom Corp. v. Google.  
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precedent založený v případu Playboy. Tento rozpor a definitivní vyřešení otázky „užití 
ochranných známek v obchodním styku“ v rámci reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových 
slov v USA přineslo až rozhodnutí odvolacího soudu druhého obvodu v případu 
Rescuecom v. Google. Toto rozhodnutí omezilo závěry z rozhodnutí 1-800 Contacts 
pouze na specifické případy obdobné fungování softwaru společnosti WhenU.com tak, 
jak byl popsán výše. Pozornost stran sporů se tak přesunula k druhé překážce vlastníků 
ochranných známek, a to povinnosti prokázat „nebezpečí záměny u spotřebitelů“.   
5.2. Nebezpečí záměny 
Judikatura soudů v USA v otázce „nebezpečí záměny u spotřebitelů“ není ani 
k dnešnímu dni plně jednotná. Při rozhodování soudy aplikovaly testy či teorie vyvinuté 
v rámci jednotlivých odvolacích obvodů, které měly poskytovat vodítko ke správnému 
rozhodnutí ve věci. Tyto testy se ovšem navzájem liší a často nedostatečně reflektují 
specifika internetového prostředí. Proto došlo v rámci některých obvodů k modifikaci 
tradičních testů za účelem jejich přizpůsobení moderním technologiím.  
K nejdůležitějším tradičním testům patří zejména Sleekcraft test devátého 
okruhu254, který byl aplikován například v případu Playboy. K testům vyvinutým za 
účelem jejich použití na spory z prostředí internetu patří například tzv. Internetová 
trojka255. Specifickým testem přizpůsobeným zvláště na problematiku reklamy 
prostřednictvím klíčových slov je pak tzv. Internetová čtyřka256 (anglicky „Internet 
quadrangle“) vytvořená v případu Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts. 
Soudy ovšem opakovaně judikovaly, že tyto testy představují pouze jakési vodítko pro 
rozhodovaní a nikoli závaznou stupnici, kterou by byly povinny aplikovat ve všech 
případech neměnným způsobem.  
Mimo výše uvedené testy pak hrála velmi významnou roli specifická teorie 
nebezpečí záměny úspěšně uplatněna např. v případu Playboy, a to teorie tzv. 
„nebezpečí záměny při počátečním zájmu“ (anglicky „initial interest confusion“). To 
nastává ještě předtím, než dojde k samotnému nákupu zboží nebo služeb. Její podstatou 
je skutečnost, že spotřebitel, který projeví zájem o určitý produkt, si v mnoha případech 
při zobrazení sponzorované internetové stránky ihned uvědomí, že se neocitá na 
                                                            
254 Pozn. autora: Test byl vytvořen v případu AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats. Skládá se z 9 faktorů, jako 
jsou síla ochranné známky, podobnost produktů, důkaz o skutečné záměně apod.  
255 Pozn. autora: Test byl  vytvořen v případu Brookfield a skládá se z 3 faktorů, kterými jsou podobnost 
známek, příbuznost zboží a služeb a simultánní použití internetu jako marketingového kanálu.  
256 Pozn. autora: Faktory testu jsou (i) síla ochranné známky, (ii) důkaz o skutečné záměně, (iii) druh 
zboží a péče, kterou spotřebitelé u takového zboží při jeho nákupu zpravidla vynakládají a konečně 
zejména (iv) označení a vhled reklamy. 
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stránkách původně hledaného prodejce. Jelikož ovšem stránky inzerentů zpravidla 
nabízejí alternativní produkty, dokončí přesto mnoho uživatelů nákup na těchto 
stránkách. Vlastníkovi ochranné známky tak vzniká škoda již návštěvou sponzorované 
stránky.   
Jak vidno z uvedených příkladů, soudy se při rozhodování, zda došlo k nebezpečí 
záměny, řídily nejednotnými hledisky. Byť žalobci dosáhli řady dílčích vítězství, jako 
například v případu Rosetta Stone v. Google, ve kterém odvolací soud zrušil rozhodnutí 
soudu prvního stupně ve prospěch žalobce, lze celkově považovat výsledky sporů za 
drtivé vítězství poskytovatelů internetových vyhledávačů, neboť neexistuje žádné 
konečné rozhodnutí, které by založilo jejich přímou odpovědnost. Je ovšem třeba 
poznamenat, že stejně tak žádné rozhodnutí jejich činnost přesvědčivě nelegitimizovalo.  
V drtivé většině případů, které se jevily jako slibné z pohledu vlastníků 
ochranných známek, dokázali poskytovatelé internetových vyhledávačů uzavřít smír a 
vyhnout se tak konečnému rozhodnutí. Jindy se vlastníci ochranných známek vzdali a 
vzali žaloby zpět anebo prohráli z jiných důvodů (např. neprokázali existenci 
ochranných známek nebo byla jejich práva promlčena). Je tedy patrné, že byť byly 
žaloby opakovaně neúspěšné, neexistuje přesto k dnešnímu dni žádný precedent, který 
by do budoucna vlastníkům ochranných známek bránil domáhat se ochrany proti 
poskytovatelům internetových vyhledávačů soudní cestou. Nicméně převažuje názor, že 
s rychle rostoucí rozšířeností internetu a jeho každodenním užíváním průměrnými 
spotřebiteli, se šance na prokázání "nebezpečí záměny" podstatným způsobem 
snižuje257.     
6. Judikatura soudů v EU 
Přestože se problematika reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových slov začala v EU 
řešit o několik let později než v USA, existuje již k dnešnímu dni řada důležitých 
rozhodnutí, a to jak na úrovni ESD, tak národních soudů členských států.  
Zřejmě nejpodstatnějším rozdílem mezi přístupy v USA a EU k užití ochranných 
známek jako klíčových slov pro reklamu na internetu je skutečnost, že ESD odmítl 
možnost přímé odpovědnosti poskytovatelů internetových vyhledávačů, neboť 
                                                            
257 Pozn. autora: Zejména ve světle dvou nedávných rozhodnutí, a to General Steel Domestic 
Sales, LLC v. Chumley a Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman, ve kterých ani zobrazení 
ochranné známky přímo v textu komerčního sdělení způsobem, který nebyl srovnávací reklamou, 
nestačilo vlastníkům ochranných známek k jejich vítězství.  
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v případu Google France rozhodl, že tito poskytovatelé „neužívají ochranné známky v 
obchodním styku“. Z toho důvodu není možné naplnit požadavky pro založení 
odpovědnosti za porušení práv k ochranné známce, a to bez ohledu na intenzitu porušení 
ostatních zkoumaných hledisek. Osobou, která ochrannou známku „užívá“ je v EU 
pouze sám inzerent. Odpovědnost poskytovatelů internetových vyhledávačů tak může 
být založena pouze sekundárně, např. prostřednictvím předpisů členských států proti 
nekalé soutěži, které zpravidla poskytují paralelní ochranu k známkoprávní úpravě a 
jichž se může držitel ochranné známky dovolávat buď samostatně nebo spolu 
se známkoprávní ochranou.   
K závěru, zda došlo činností inzerenta k porušení práv k ochranné známce, je 
třeba zkoumat, zda je „užití“ schopné způsobit újmu některé z funkcí ochranné známky. 
ESD judikoval, že újma může být způsobena zejména základní funkci označení původu 
a dále funci investiční258. Dále již ESD poskytl pouze obecná hlediska, kterými je třeba 
se ve všech případech řídit s tím, že konečné rozhodnutí ponechal na vnitrostátních 
soudech. To zapříčinilo, že judikatura národních soudů v této věci není jednotná. 
Rozhodnutí ESD umožňuje více interpretací a nedostatečně osvětluje, kde se nachází 
tenká hranice mezi povolenou reklamou a porušením práv majitelů ochranných známek. 
Zatímco tedy např. v Německu v případu Bananabay či ve Francii v případu Auto IES 
soudy konstatovaly, že inzerenti neporušili reklamou prostřednictvím klíčových slov 
předpisy na ochranu ochranných známek, k opačnému závěru došel rakouský Nejvyšší 
soud v případu Bergspechte. Obecně lze ovšem říci, že ve většině případů soudy 
opustily od shledání porušení práv majitelů ochranných známek, pokud byly inzeráty 
řádně označeny, byly rozpoznatelné, jméno inzerenta se objevilo alespoň jako součást 
URL adresy a ochranná známka nebyla zobrazena v reklamním sdělení. 
7. Imunita poskytovatelů internetových vyhledávačů 
V obou jurisdikcích, tedy jak v USA, tak v EU, byla navíc poskytovatelům 
internetových vyhledávačů za splnění stanovených podmínek přiznána imunita z 
odpovědnosti za porušení práv z ochranných známek. Zatímco v USA se tato výjimka 
vztahuje pouze na státní nároky z práv duševního vlastnictví a federální nároky jsou tak 
bezvýjimečně vyloučeny, v EU se aplikuje imunita založená směrnicí o elektronickém 
                                                            
258 Pozn. autora: Funkcní označení původu se soud zabýval zejména v rozhodnutí Google France. Funkcí 
investiční pak v rozhodnutí Interflora.  
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obchodu do okamžiku, než se poskytovatel internetového vyhledávače o protiprávním 
jednání inzerenta dozví. 
8. Judikatura v ČR 
V minulém roce bylo též vydáno průlomové a dosud nepravomocné rozhodnutí 
v případu Teco proti Seznam.cz týkající se reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových slov 
v ČR. Jednalo se o první žalobu v ČR, které směřovala přímo proti poskytovateli 
internetového vyhledávače. Městský soud v Praze následoval judikaturu ESD a odmítl 
přímou odpovědnost poskytovatele za zobrazovanou reklamu. Naopak soud 
konstatoval, že primárně odpovědným subjektem je v této věci inzerent. Soud nicméně 
aplikoval jakousi sekundární odpovědnost založenou zákonem o vymáhání práv 
z průmyslového vlastnictví a uložil poskytovateli povinnost sjednat nápravu a sdělit 
žalobci identifikační údaje inzerenta.     
9. Závěr 
Cílem práce bylo poskytnout komplexní analýzu obou transatlantických přístupů 
k řešení otázky reklamy prostřednictvím klíčových slov. Z výše uvedených kapitol 
vyplývá, že soudy zatím nedospěly k jednotné a ustálené judikatuře. Byť závěry soudů 
v USA ohledně odpovědnosti poskytovatelů internetových vyhledávačů nejsou tak 
jednoznačné jako v EU, v obou případech se šance majitelů ochranných známek na 
úspěch proti ekonomicky silným a vlivným poskytovatelům jeví jako minimální a dá se 
tak předpokládat, že budoucí spory budou vedeny zejména proti samotným inzerentům. 
Ačkoli tak tato problematika ještě není považována za definitivně uzavřenou, odborníci 
se shodují, že s postupem času se šance majitelů ochranných známek na úspěch 
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